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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of William T. Argent for the Master of Arts Degree in 
TESOL: presented October 2, 1996. 
Title: Humor Recognition: A Comparative Analysis 
There are various approaches to the explanation of humor in the field of 
humor research. Some of these theories, while providing interesting insight into 
the phenomenon known as humor, remain limited in their ability to account for 
how humor is recognized. Others do not even address the issue. This thesis 
compares five different theories in humor research by analyzing the humorous 
short story "My Watch" by Mark Twain. These theories are: 1. a typological 
approach to humor, 2. a social- functional model, 3. incongruity theory, 4. 
Grice's Cooperative Principle taken from linguistic pragmatics, and 5. the 
General Theory of Verbal Humor devised by V. Raskin and S. Attardo. The 
comparative analysis, following an extensive review of the literature, first 
interprets the humor in the short story in the light of each theoretical model. 
During the course of the analysis, the limitations inherent in each theories' 
treatment of humor are illustrated and these argue and provide evidence for the 
adoption of the General Theory of Verbal Humor because of its greater 
sophistication in building a model of humor recognition. Furthermore, in 
analyzing Twain's short story this thesis establishes the generalizability of this 
more sophisticated theory to at least some types of literary humor, specifically 
the tall tale. Finally, further research implications and general connections 
between the theoretical approaches discussed in this thesis and the teaching of 
the English language to non-native speakers highlight the practicality of 
applying insights from humor research to the field of teaching. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction, Proposal and Overview 
I. Introduction 
Everybody loves a good joke. And good joke tellers are valued 
conversation partners in many social situations. We describe friends and 
acquaintances as having good senses of humor and think it a positive thing. 
Comic strips, political cartoons, jokes and tall tales surround us in daily life. 
Mostly, they are appreciated and sorely needed, but seldom do we stop to think 
about how we come to understand humor. 
Questions of whether a joke or tale is funny or not involve too many 
things to determine any specific characteristic that makes it funny. The 
presentation plays a key role, and the number of times one is exposed to a joke 
is also a factor. Personal traits such as age, sex, intelligence and education 
likewise determine if one laughs or not. Finding something funny is often even 
a matter of overall taste, and an individuals mood at any given moment may be 
the most influential of all in guiding the response to a joke. Clearly, 
understanding how we come to understand humor involves more than asking 
ourselves if something is amusing or not. Rather, when we pause over the 
funny pages or a comic story, we should asks ourselves how we know it is 
supposed to be funny in the first place. 
II. Proposal 
This question is more difficult than it might initially seem. There are 
various approaches to the explanation of humor in the field of humor research. 
Some of these theories, while providing interesting insight into the 
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phenomenon known as humor, remain limited in their ability to account for how 
humor is recognized. Others do not even address the issue. It is the purpose of 
this thesis to compare five different theories in humor research by analyzing a 
humorous short story. These theories are: 1. a typological approach to humor, 
2. a functional model, 3. incongruity theory, and 4. two opposing theories based 
on principles taken from linguistic pragmatics. The comparative analysis, which 
follows an extensive review of the literature, will first interpret the humor 
contained in the short story in the light of each specific theoretical model as 
none of the theories discussed in this thesis have been applied to extended 
pieces of literary humor. During the course of the analysis, this thesis will 
illustrate the particular limitations inherent in each theory's treatment of humor. 
Next, the thesis will argue and provide evidence for the adoption of one of these 
five over the other four because of its greater sophistication in building a model 
of humor recognition. Most significantly, it will be shown that the model of 
verbal humor defended by this thesis can indeed be generalized to at least 
some types of literary humor. Finally, further research implications and general 
connections between the theoretical approaches discussed in this thesis and 
the teaching of the English language to non-native speakers will illustrate the 
practicality of applying insights from humor research to the field of teaching. 
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Ill. Typologies of Humor 
The first and perhaps most natural approach to investigating humor is to 
ask what kind of humor it is. The typological approach focuses on this particular 
question. It asks what category under which a particular instance of humor fits. 
Bergson (1900) argued that through categorizations and lists of necessary and 
sufficient f ea tu res the researcher into the humorous could classify instances of 
humor and thereby explain the phenemenon. That is to say the humor 
typologist believed it was possible to use taxonomies to distinguish the 
humorous from the non-humorous. 
Without doubt some knowledge is gained via typing pieces of humor. We 
describe the Three Stooges as a slapstick troupe, and Monty Python would fit 
under the category of absurd. Knock-Knock jokes are clearly just that, and there 
are Shaggy Dog stories and Garden Path jokes. The person familiar with all of 
these types (there are of course many others) undoubtedly is able to distinguish 
certain properties particular to these classes. Even though unfamiliar with The 
Three Stooges, such a person would be able to predict the trips, falls and eye-
poking of Moe, Larry and Curly. In the case of the British sextet, one aware of 
the tendencies of absurd humor would know to predict the unpredictable. The 
offbeat, silly and wildly satirical are the orders of the day. Likewise, knock-
knock jokes contain the established opening phrases, Shaggy Dog stories are 
very long and drawn out, while Garden Path jokes are supposed to mislead. So 
even though one is not aware of the specifics of a piece of humor, by knowing 
the class into which it fits one is able to describe it to a degree. However, this 
treatment is very limited and has little explanatory value. 
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The most telling problem is that it is not clear that these categories are 
distinct. Certainly there are elements characteristic of slapstick, but where does 
it leave off and absurd humor begin? Monty Python obviously utilizes some of 
these characteristics, the falling and hitting for example. But this does not make 
it pure slapstick. The skit involving the department of funny walks illustrates this 
well. Although typical slapstick falls are used, the humor resides more in the 
absurdity of a governmental department of funny walks. Therefore, if 
characteristics can appear across categories, then it is difficult to say exactly 
what distinguishes one type from another. With classes like knock-knock jokes 
it would be absurd to claim that the openers, i.e. Knock-knock! Who's there?, 
always indicate a joke every time they are used. In the cases of Shaggy Dog 
stories we also cannot claim that long, drawn out tales are consistently meant to 
be humorous. The ref ore, it is easy to see that an attempt to explain humor via 
categories cannot be used to explain how humor is recognized vis a vis non-
humor. 
IV. The Social Nature of Humor 
Another approach in humor research that provides interesting insights is 
social functional in nature. Instead of trying to distinguish one type of humor 
from another, this treatment investigates what humor does in respect to the 
structure of a conversation and the social atmosphere it creates or fosters. 
Social functionalist depictions of humor concentrate on exactly this. 
Norrick (1994), in showing the function humor has in society, describes the role 
joking plays in a conversation and the effect it has on the individuals involved. 
During the course of many conversations intermittent wisecracks, jokes, and 
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tales fit smoothly (barring a faux pas) into the overall flow and serve to organize 
parts of it. The discussion at a dinner party of the latest Seinfeld episode or 
Letterman's newest 1 O worst list influence the people's own comments, and the 
discussion itself is influenced by their own joking. For two minutes straight two 
people add their own items to Letterman's list and this joking becomes a mini-
conversation in itself. In the process of all this a social rapport is being created. 
The people are bonding as it were. At the same time some of the joking takes 
the form of an intelligence test. Witty comments are made to see if others can 
understand. And the aggressiveness of humor is exposed by targeting people, 
places and things that are different, thus fostering group identification and inter-
group antagonism. By looking at what joking does, socially speaking, we see 
that it is like other behavior. It is capable of creating power relationships, 
building up and breaking down social barriers, creating tolerances and 
intolerances. But a social view of humor does not tell us anything about our 
ability to recognize it. Just walk up to anyone and tell them the following joke 
with no preliminaries. Q.- What do you call a man with no arms and no legs 
lying in front of your door? A.- Matt. If they recognize it as a joke, ask them how. 
The last thing you will hear is a lecture on sensitivity to the handicapped. A 
social functional approach to humor assumes the recognition of humor as its 
starting point and therefore does not address the issue of how one recognized 
the humor in the first place. Clearly, even though such an approach is 
interesting, it does not look at the intent to be funny. 
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V. Humor and Incongruity Theory 
A third approach to the question of humor recognition is incongruity 
theory. The crux of this approach is that all jokes, funny stories, riddles, etc., 
contain paradoxical or incongruous elements. Nerhardt ( 1975) argues that 
perceiving incongruity is necessary for perceiving humor. The most easily seen 
cases of this lie in jokes centered on ambiguity. So elemental does this seem 
that it is even found in children's jokes. Q.- What's black and white and 
red(read) all over? A.- A newspaper. Even children pick up on the homonym 
pair and the pun made on the pronunciation and spelling of read and red. 
Perhaps this is all it takes to know that something is a joke. Find a paradox, 
pun, opposing pair or ambiguous element, and you will know it is a joke. 
Rothbart (1975) found this treatment a bit lacking, and in her studies with 
children discovered that the way an incongruity is resolved influences how it is 
recognized. The distinction between perceiving some event as humorous or 
frightening seems to lie in the probability of it really occurring. Slapstick humor 
illustrates this well. Moe Howard of The Three Stooges maliciously sticks his 
finger into Curly's eye and the audience duly laughs. Because we know that 
Curly is not really hurt we have no problem in resolving the incongruity of 
acceptable versus unacceptable behavior in terms of a very low likelihood of 
occurrence. Anyone observing the trio, and not knowing who they are, at first 
thinks Moe has truly injured his victim. To the viewer the likelihood of 
occurrence is rather high. Only a sociopath would laugh then. After seeing that 
it was only pretend, they are likely to become angry. In the horror genre of film 
and literature, our suspension of disbelief allows us to fool ourselves into 
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believing that a monster could really be under the bed. We know in reality that 
no such thing exists, but in order to have the fun of a good (safe) fright we have 
to assume it could. 
Not every type of humor is as easy to explain as slapstick is. Riddles do 
not seem to need resolving via probabilities of occurrence. These clever, little 
word-puzzles may be tests that possibly could result in anxiety, but they are not 
fear inspiring scenarios. It is difficult to imagine what would need to occur, or 
not occur, in the following riddle to make it or prevent it from being scary. a.-
What is it that falls often but never gets hurt? A - Snow. The limitaUons of the 
incongruity model of humor are very apparent. Not only does it not account for 
all types of humor, it also is not very descriptive. It is one thing to say that humor 
is based on a paradox or opposite pair, but it is another thing entirely to map out 
such pairs and to explain how their use enables us to recognize humor as such. 
Many other types of figurative communication use incongruous elements; the 
horror genre comes quickly to mind, yet we do not interpret their intent as being 
humorous. Therefore, it is clear that incongruity theory alone cannot distinguish 
humor from horror, romance literature or science fiction, among others 
Linguistic pragmatics offers a good deal more information about how we 
know a joke to be a joke. Pragmatics deals with such things as meaning in 
context and it proves to be very useful in investigating humor. It is especially so 
when you think about times when you mean more than you actually say. All of 
us can come up with examples where what we said was not at all what we 
meant. This does not include times of confusion, but rather occasions when it is 
intentional to all parties involved and everybody understands exactly what is 
meant. At a dinner party the guests are talking over coffee and one says to 
another: "Please pass the sugar!" Looking down at the two plates in his hands 
he answers: "My hands are full." A womah listening in reaches over and 
passes it instead. The person who asked for the sugar understood the answer 
to mean " Sorry, I can't." and so did the woman. All three automatically made 
incredibly fast intuitive leaps from what was said to what was meant. It is really 
not all that different with humor. Nobody who gets a joke takes it at face value. 
Otherwise both Henny Youngman and his wife would have had plenty of 
interesting nights every time he said "Take my wife, please!" during a stand up 
routine. Clearly humor is also an instance of meaning more than you actually 
say, and like the request at the dinner party, pragmatics contains principles 
designed to account for the leap of faith. 
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The most important pragmatic principle used in humor research is Grice's 
Cooperative Principle (CP). In 1975 Grice wrote about the leap of intuition that 
is needed to get from the face value of things people say to the real meaning 
that they intend. He argued that we all operate under the assumption (until 
given a good reason not to) that we are cooperating with each other. The crux 
of the whole cooperative endeavor lies in the maxims of saying what you need 
to say, when you need to say it and how it needs to be said. You have to 
provide the correct quantity of information and you have to say only what you 
think is true. Clarity and brevity are musts, and relevance is probably the most 
important maxim of all. 
Grice knew that we often do not obey the maxims to the letter, and very 
few problems ever occur because of it. That is because of our ability to leap 
beyond the letter of cooperation to its spirit. That is how the eavesdropper at the 
dinner party knew that the man was not going to pass the sugar. She continued 
to assume that he was cooperating and formed a chain of inferences based on 
that fact. Her unconscious intuition allowed her to go from the letter to the spirit 
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of cooperation. Relevance seems to be the sticky point here. She can see with 
her eyes that the response is true and clear. It also must be sufficient or else 
she would not pass the sugar herself. On the surface, the answer "My hands 
are full." may seem irrelevant, but this is where the leap comes into play. The 
fact that the man's hands are definitely full along with the knowledge that most 
people most of the time respond to requests leads her on an incredibly fast 
search for relevance. 
VI. The Pragmatics of Humor 
Humor researchers like Pratt (1981) and Martinich (1981) seek to explain 
humor recognition via the Gricean maxims. They separately argue that the 
author of a piece of literary humor flouts the CP. Grice described several types 
of disobeying the maxims with flouting being the most interesting. Unlike cases 
of silently not fulfitling, or violating, a maxim which results in a lie, flouts are 
deliberate, and the intent of the speaker or writer is that they be immediately 
obvious. Such is the case with the man at the dinner party. On the surface his 
answer is so clearly irrelevant that the various listeners will see through it to the 
deeper, intended relevance. Humor researchers who use the CP in their 
models believe that this is also the case with a funny story and its author. Pratt 
discusses this by looking at Lawrence Sterne's Tristam Shandy . Due to the 
nature of the publishing business, she argues that any non-fulfillment of the 
maxims would be either unintentional and weeded out in the editing process, 
meaning that we readers would never get to see them, or else it would be 
intentional and the author wants us to recognize it. Because Sterne's tale is a 
piece of fiction, we do not interpret the transgressions as being silent violations. 
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No one familiar with literature would accuse Sterne of trying to sneak past a lie. 
Rather, Sterne wants us to know what he is doing and to laugh along with him, 
and we understand that. According to Pratt he flouts, not violates the CP. 
Martinich likewise claims that the author of a literary piece of humor takes 
liberties with the Gricean maxims. He uses the conversations between Alice 
and various characters in Carroll's Alice books to illustrate the difference 
between a character violating a maxim and the author at the same time flouting 
it. Anyone who has read these stories is familiar with the quirky nature of what 
the characters say. Alice is frustrated at times, and often confused, by the 
blatantly uncooperative responses she receives. For Martinich it is clear that 
the character, say the March Hare, is slyly violating the CP. Their intents are not 
to make sufficient, true relevant, brief and orderly contributions. Instead they 
trick, tease and undermine what Alice thinks she knows constantly throughout 
the works. But from Carroll's perspective that is precisely the point. Without 
question Carroll wants us to appreciate his tricks with the English language. 
Some are so clever that perhaps Carroll is testing the reader to see how 
nimble-minded he is. Still, he is not writing in secret code and he no doubt 
rejoices every time we find him witty. The March Hare may violate the CP but 
not Carroll. He is as committed to it as anyone in a normal conversation. 
Anything in the stories not conforming to the letter of the CP, according to 
Martinich must obey its spirit and therefore be a flout. 
Not everyone in the field agrees with this. Dolitsky (1992) points out the 
limitations of this interpretation. Rather than humor, in literature or elsewhere, 
being the product of a flout, she contends that it is in fact a quiet violation of the 
CP. Even in situations where the audience is forewarned, where they anticipate 
the humor to come and thereby become more attuned to it, they nevertheless 
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still do not know the exact shape it will have, and Dolitsky claims this contains 
the heart of the violation. 
Because every time you need to explain a joke, it loses a bit of its humor, 
Dolitsky believes that it is in the unspoken elements of humor that funniness 
resides. In most jokes there is a punch line that must in some way come as a 
surprise, if the joke is to be at all funny. You know a punch line is coming, but 
as long as you do not know what it is, the potential for humor is there. If you 
have heard the joke before, you may still think it amusing, but your reaction will 
not be as strong as when you originally heard it. 
A very large amount of the surprise is contained in cultural knowledge. 
Often jokes will take you down the garden path, only to spring upon you at the 
end the real path your thoughts should have taken. For example: Madonna 
does not have it, the Pope does but doesn't use it. Bush has a short one and 
Gorbachev a long one. What is it? A.- a last name. The people who get the 
joke, regardless of whether they find it funny, understand it because they all 
share some common background information. Everybody knows to some 
degree or other what everybody else knows. First, we all know who these 
people are, and that they are people. Next, we possess cultural knowledge 
about the Pope and Madonna that allows us to contrast the two in terms of 
stereotypical promiscuity. We all know what the Pope has but does not use, 
and the contrast to Madonna who does not have but seems to ·use' a lot 
highlights this. We also know that Bush and Gorbachev were political rivals and 
the whole story conjures up a picture of boys comparing things behind barns. 
It is precisely such scenarios which the joke forces you to think of. It 
makes you picture stereotypical patterns and sequences of events (celibates 
and wanton women) and then, at the very end it throws a monkey wrench into 
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the picture by showing us a less 'interesting' connection. According to Dolitsky 
this is a clear violation of the CP, a deliberate infraction against the maxim 
which involves clarity. There is enough information to get the answer right, but if 
you get the joke then you obviously got the answer wrong. And if you got it 
wrong, it must be due to some ambiguity or obscurity in the presentation. This is 
of course deliberate. A person telling this joke does not want everyone yelling 
out "Last Name" at the end of it. The listeners are supposed say something a 
little more risque. Due then to the teller's intent, the transgression must be a 
violation and not a flout, because the intent of a violation is to mislead. 
Attardo and Raskin (1994) agree with this but think that it does not go far 
enough. They contend that humor routinely violates the maxim of quality, 
because the speaker/writer does not believe what she says in any normal 
sense of the word. The authors argue that not only does humor violate the CP, 
it is in reality outside the scope of the CP. Humor is non-bona-fide mode of 
communication, where a bona-fide mode adheres to the mandatory fulfillment of 
the G ricean maxims in letter or in spirit. 
Therefore they posit a non-bona-fide CP for humor with six knowledge 
resources that inform the piece of humor. 1. Script oppositions, 2. the language, 
3. the logical mechanisms, 4. the target, 5. the narrative strategy, and 6. the 
situation are all parts which make up the funny tale. It is in these knowledge 
resources that the violation of the Gricean CP is committed by the speaker and 
recognized by the hearer, thereby signalling non-bona-fide communication. 
Deliberately creating ambiguities in the language or purposefully causing 
unrealistic scenarios to be thought of by using certain targets or situations 
violate Grice's CP, but they adhere to a humor CP which has the following 
maxims. 1. Give the necessary amount of information for the joke and say only 
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what is consistent with the joke, and 2. Be relevant to the context of the joke, 
and tell it efficiently. By investigating the manner in which Gricean violations in 
the six knowledge resources allow the hearer to backtrack to this CP this thesis 
will attempt to show that Raskin and Attardo have created a much more 
sophisticated model of humor recognition than joke typologies, incongruity 
theory or Grice's maxims alone. Investigations into the role humor plays 
socially, while providing keen insights into what humor does, neglect its 
recognizability altogether. 
A comparative analysis of these five theories utilizing a piece of 
humorous prose will illustrate this claim and at the same time show that Raskin 
and Attardo have created a model which is generalizable to at least some types 
of literary humor. Any randomly selected funny story should suffice as a vehicle, 
but because one aspect of this thesis is to connect the research done here to 
the teaching of the English language, I have chosen the piece "My Watch" by an 
important figure in American literary history, Mark Twain. However, before this 
can begin a more complete look at the literature of the field is necessary. 
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Chapter Two 
Review of the Literature 
In order to perform an analysis of a work of humorous fictional prose, a 
review of the pertinent literature on the topic is necessary. As theories of humor 
begin in antiquity, this discussion will bypass all of these works and commence 
with a classic piece of humor research written in 1900. 
Bergson (1900) states that comic effects are incapable of translation 
because they refer to customs and ideas of a particular social group. It 
therefore follows that the comic expressed by language, when translated, would 
lose the greater portion of its significance when introduced into a society 
different in manners and above all in associations of ideas. Due to this well 
acknowledged belief, Bergson argues that any investigation into laughter must 
involve particular requirements of life in common. That is to say that it must be 
socially significant. Because of the social nature of humor, any notion of society 
in terms of the ready-made, stereotypical or inert will potentially be perceived as 
laughable. Any form or formula is in and of itself a frame for the humorous. 
Bergson believed that an explanatory account of humor could be achieved 
through contextualization and categorization. While the former is still today 
recognized as being of paramount importance in humor research, the latter has 
been found to be quite insufficient. Typologies focusing exclusively on the 
targets of humor, such as ethnic group or sex, and the form, as with Garden 
Path or Knock-Knock jokes, are subject to great proliferation and also fail to look 
at what makes humor recognizable. 
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Apte (1985) describes three elements to be considered when 
researching humor. They are the sources acting as potential stimuli, the 
cognitive and intellectual activity responsible for the perception and evaluation 
of these sources, and the behavioral responses to the stimuli. Investigations 
into the first and third of these research areas lead to descriptions of 
physiological mechanisms and models of social functions, and these remain 
outside the focus of this thesis. 
In order to examine the cognitive activity that takes place in recognizing 
humor, one must first view the context of the humorous incident. In terms of 
linguistic acts, this falls under the realm of pragmatics. Green (1989) defines 
pragmatics as "the study of actions deliberately undertaken with the intent of 
causing the addressee to reassess his model of the world; this includes his 
systems of values, his perceived models of the speaker's belief systems, 
attitudes, plans and intentions (p. 48)." 
As humans, most of us resort to language when we wish to communicate. 
And a language is comprised of among other things a lexicon, a syntax and a 
compositional semantics. The conventionality of all these combined with the 
fact that fully competent speakers are not always able to determine the intended 
referent argues against a fully semantic account of meaning. Therefore in 
Green's words, a more realistic assessment of the meaning conveying potential 
of any utterance is the limit set by the interaction between the principles of 
pragmatics and Truth-conditional semantics. 
In any social discourse, it is obvious that what is said, to a large degree, 
conveys more meaning than the actual utterance would indicate. It is precisely 
the principles that speakers make use of in conveying more than they really say, 
which will play a large role in the analysis of any communicative act. These 
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principles of pragmatics are based on a long series of assumptions 
unconsciously made by all parties in the communicative exchange. These 
assumptions in turn deal with such subjects as knowledge of the world, 
historical and cultural background, politeness and cooperation. Green uses an 
example of a drowning man and a would be rescuer to illustrate this claim. 
Upon seeing the man in trouble the rescuer throws him a life saving ring. He 
does this without consciously realizing that he is assuming the drowner will 
recognize the device for what it is, understand that its presence is meant to help 
him, know what to do with it, react accordingly (if possible), etc. Likewise 
assumptions about assumptions follow in that the rescuer takes for granted that 
the drowning man understands that he (the rescuer) understands the need for 
help, and on and on. 
One series of assumptions Grice (1975) first formulated in his 
Cooperative Principle (CP). The CP is an attempt to explain why the 
distinctions believed to hold between certain logical operators in the formalisms 
of logicians and their natural language counterparts were not valid beyond the 
sentence level. The argument is that natural language is governed by a set of 
socio-behavioural rules not explained by logical formalisms. The crux of his CP 
is that the participants in a real conversation should "make their contributions 
such as is required, at the stage in which they occur, by the accepted purpose 
or direction of the talk exchange in which they are engaged (p. 45)." 
Lakoff ( 1973) also argues for a pragmatic approach to meaning because 
only through the context can we account for the unacceptability of some 
sentences which under other conditions are considered quite normal. Lakoff 
gives as examples the sentences: "Who wants some beans?" and "Who wants 
any beans?", whose difference lies in the speaker's assumption as to whether 
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or not beans are wanted, to illustrate the claim that a sentence that is perfectly 
acceptable under one set of conditions might be unacceptable under another 
and therefore the pragmatic content of a speech act must be taken into account 
in determining its acceptability. In considering the areas of pragmatic behavior 
Lakoff posits two rules of Pragmatic Competence: 1. Be clear.; and 2. Be polite. 
She argues that the first of these are formulated in Grice's CP and "when clarity 
conflicts with politeness, in most cases politeness supersedes (p. 297)." 
According to Lakoff it is more important to avoid offense than to achieve clarity. 
For example indirectly asking "May I ask you how much you paid for that 
watch?" instead of blurting out "How much did that cost?", is explained not by 
the speaker being interested in clarity but rather the interest in politeness. Yet 
this does not seem to consider that pure clarity could often jeopardize the CP, 
as the addressee could take offense at an explicitly clear utterance and walk 
away. This then represents a clash (see below) between aspects of the CP that 
must be resolved in a way to rescue the cooperative endeavor. For example, 
One says the more polite "Would you please lend me a hand?" instead of "Hey, 
Help me!" because the speaker deems it necessary at this stage of the 
conversation to be more polite in order to more likelysecure the hearer's 
cooperation. One can envision later stages after the duo has established a less 
formal but still neutral relationship, where politeness may not be deemed so 
necessary. That is to say that politeness is itself a contribution required at a 
necessary stage in the conversation. So while politeness indeed seems to 
belong in the CP, that does not mean the CP is subservient to it. 
Underlying the Cooperative Principle is the fact that humans are social 
creatures, and as such we have an overpowering and innate need to 
communicate with one another. In order to accomplish this social goal, we must 
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assume that other participants in any communicative endeavor are cooperating, 
until such time as we are proven wrong. If in any speech situation we doubt that 
the speaker is committed to the CP without having adequate evidence to 
support this doubt, the only thing that can be inf erred is the fact that the speaker 
spoke. 
In searching for an explanation as to how we indeed manage to 
communicate with each other, it becomes clear that instances of discourse 
lacking in formal cohesion must be taken into account. It is precisely these that 
are treated in Grice's CP, which is comprised of four maxims; 
1. Quantity- Make the contribution as informative as required. 
2. Quality - Do not say what you do not believe, or what you lack 
evidence for. 
3. Manner - Do not be obscure or ambiguous. Be brief and orderly. 
4. Relevance - Be relevant. 
Grice argues that many instances of conversation containing no formal linkage 
are interpretable due to the exploitation of these maxims. By exploiting, Grice 
means the intentional, blatant nonfulfillment of a maxim such that the addressee 
is forced to recognize the nonfulfillment and thereby interpret it in such a way so 
that it somehow seems nevertheless to conform to the maxim or is either fulfilled 
via some other maxim. This then accounts for how we know that Bob doesn't 
walk to school in the following exchange: A.- Does Bob walk to school? B. He 
lives in Tigard. 
Grice describes four types of intentional nonfulfillment. They are as 
follows: 
1. The speaker may quietly violate a maxim, which in some cases will mislead 
the addressee. This often generates lies of either commission or omission. 2. A 
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speaker may 'opt out' of the CP entirely by explicitly indicating a non-
willingness to participate. Good examples are found every time a politician 
says no comment. 3. A speaker may be confronted with a clash. That is to say 
the fulfillment of one maxim will lead to a violation of another as in when a 
person masks vital information in clear violation of the Manner sub maxim 'be 
clear' in order to more readily abide by the maxim of Quality which states do not 
say that which you lack adequate evidence for. 4. A speaker may flout a maxim, 
i.e. he may blatantly fail to fulfill it on the assumption that the addressee will 
recognize the flout and nevertheless interpret it so as to make it conform to the 
maxim. For example: A man says to his wife " please pick up the kids" and she 
responds "I'm working". On the suriace the answer doesn't relate in any way to 
the request. Automatically the man then begins to form a chain of inferences 
such as, I assume she is responding to what I said and is indeed cooperating 
with me, therefore my wife's utterance was relevant even though it doesn't 
appear to be. This interpretation is much preferable to me believing that she is 
nutty and does not understand me, or that she is not interested in cooperating 
with me. So I can assume she means she doesn't have time and this tells me to 
make other plans for the children. In generating such a chain of inferences we 
create what Grice called conversational implicatures and it is through these that 
we exploit the maxims. However it is not always so easy to see the chain of 
inferences, choose among possible chains, nor halt the proliferation of chains. 
Consider the CP violating nature of the utterance "Nice Day" at a time 
when a ferocious storm is blowing. According to Grice the hearer will construct 
an interpretation assuming the maxim of Quality was deliberately flouted, as you 
can not possibly believe what you are saying and I'm supposed to know that. 
The intent of the utterance is therefore ironic and you really mean the opposite. 
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Grice treats irony as instances of pretense with the expectation that the pretense 
will be recognized. 
However, Sperber and Wilson (1981) and (1986) take issue not only with 
this treatment of irony but also with other aspects of Grice's CP. Their first 
criticism of the Principle hinges on their interpretation of Grice's meaning of 
cooperate. When Grice wrote that speakers in a cooperative communicative 
exchange have the same purpose or goals, Sperber and Wilson read this as 
narrowly stating that the participants must have mutual access to an almost 
infinite number of propositions. As this patently can never be the case, they 
propose to refine the CP with Relevance Theory, based on mutual 
manifestness, i.e. the weaker set of inferable knowledge possessed by the 
participants in a given cognitive environment. For example, in a conversation 
such as: A.- How can I help you? B. Hand me a Hammer!, Sperber and Wilson 
would argue that a Gricean 'mutual purpose' would entail that both speakers 
hold together all the same propositions concerning knowledge of how hammers 
are used, what they are, where to locate one, ad infinitum. All the while 
propositions about the participants each realizing that the other holds these 
propositions are likewise entertained. Therefore Sperber and Wilson propose 
instead of mutual purpose or goal, the concept of mutual manifestness, which 
pares down the inferable propositions to manageable proportions. Also, 
Sperber and Wilson view the Gricean maxims as norms that must be learned in 
order to communicate adequately but which can be violated to achieve 
particular effects, whereas Relevance Theory applies without exception as 
every act of communication assumes some degree of relevance. 
Another advantage to the principle of relevance is the ability to 
hierarchically place competing chains of inferences thus allowing for a 
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description of how one chain is chosen above another. Information in a 
communicative act is first deemed relevant in a cognitive environment to the 
degree that contextual effects are present; where a contextual effect is defined 
as the effect that an assumption has on the context in terms of implications, 
strengthenings of assumptions or contradictions. The greater the contextual 
effect, the greater the relevance. For example, in the above exchange about 
Bob walking to school B's answer is relevant due to the presence of contextual 
effects. Here the effects are the implications that Bob does not walk to school, 
and that Tigard is too far away for just about anybody to walk. Effects are also 
present in the strengthening or contradicting of any assumption A might have 
had about the likelihood of Bob walking (anyplace) or Tigard being near or far. 
The degree of relevance of B's answer not only lies in the presence of these 
effects, but also in their degree of presence. Should B's answer be shockingly 
new to A, then the effect and relevance is greater than if B is confirming a 
suspicion A already entertained. 
However, the presence of these effects must be weighed against the 
processing effort involved in accessing and choosing amongst them. To utilize 
the example above with the husband and wife, the chain of inferences chosen, 
i.e. that my wife is cooperating and the utterance is relevant, which means that 
she does not have time to pick up the kids, is chosen because any other 
inferential chain would contain fewer contextual effects. For example, to infer 
that the wife were merely commenting on her present activity and desiring only 
that her husband know what she is doing at the moment would cause a 
cognitive reorganization of the husband's world to the extent that he would now 
picture his wife as working at that moment, but that is the end of the 
reorganization, or in Sperber and Wilson's words, the contextual effects. The 
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inferences leading the husband to believe that his wife does not have time to 
fulfill his request create far more contextual effects. As for processing effort it 
seems that the initial chain of inferences requires greater effort to process, but 
only on the surface. If the husband chooses the second interpretation, i. e. that 
her response is only for information, he is forced to process further inferences 
such as his wife either didn't hear him properly or didn't understand his request 
for what it was. Even further effort would be required to conclude that his wife is 
mad. With this in mind it is clear why the first interpretation is the most 
appropriate. Therefore, Sperber and Wilson argue that all else being equal the 
greater the contextual effect, the greater the relevance and all else being equal 
the smaller the processing effort, the greater the relevance. This then leads to 
the idea of optimal relevance; the point where these two conditions intersect. 
Thus when a speaker strives to understand inferential communication, he/she is 
in reality searching for optimal relevance. 
Utilizing this one is now able to explain the problem of disambiguation. 
Sperber and Wilson use as an example the following : 
"A. Ozzy Osborne is coming to dinner. 
B. I 'II bring a bat. (p. 60)" 
Here background knowledge, including context, to the extent that Osborne is a 
rock singer who once bit the head off of a bat while onstage, is necessary to 
choose from the two meanings of the ambiguous word bat. This knowledge 
allows for less processing effort in determining which of the two meanings is 
more relevant. In applying this to humor, it seems that in resolving whether 
something is a joke, a lie or a simple non-sequitor, the number of contextual 
effects along with the processing effort allow the hearer of an utterance to 
choose the correct interpretation in situations where there is some doubt. 
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Likewise, when the listener lacks the appropriate background knowledge and is 
therefore unable to either access one of the interpretations or to choose 
between them because the processing effort is the same, then the ambiguity 
goes unresolved. In the case of humor, you do not get the joke. 
Lastly, the principle of relevance also serves to explain cases of apparent 
violations of the Gricean maxims where no implicature is intended. The 
example given is the utterance "I have no brothers or sisters." instead of the 
ostensibly simpler "I have no siblings. 11 The claim is that this violates the maxim 
of Manner, a part of which contends that we should be brief. Yet a more 
accurate interpretation would be that the word sibling is more unusual, the 
processing effort is greater and therefore the longer more common phrase is 
more optimally relevant. 
Green (1990) however in pointing out that this is a refinement in the 
interpretation of the CP argues for a broader view, where the CP is the 
governing mechanism of all rational behavior and the maxims are merely 
instantiations of cooperative behavior and not corollaries to be learned. In her 
opinion Grice also never intended the meaning of cooperate to include the 
concept of mutual knowledge as Sperber and Wilson describe it.. Rather it is 
meant only in a very general sense. Therefore the concept of mutual 
manifestness should be seen not as a replacement for a cooperative condition, 
but as a more precise definition of what cooperation can be based upon. 
Likewise, the above example of apparent violation in the Manner maxim simply 
illustrates a better explanation of that sub maxim. Instead of 'Be brief' it should 
read 'make the contribution as easily processable as possible'. Finally, Green 
argues that the Principle of Relevance" is not effectively distinct from the claim, 
consistent with the CP, that the maxim of relevance is always assumed to be 
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observed (p. 414 )" This is not to say that it should replace the CP, but instead it 
should be looked at as being a more precise account of the CP maxim of 
Relevance. This more exact description will prove useful when the problems of 
humor and incongruity are discussed. First a return to the problem of irony is 
necessary. 
Sperber and Wilson's argument for a different account of irony centers on 
the notion that the types of conversational implicature found in 'standard' 
instances are not the same as those found in ironical utterances. The difference 
is that in a normal instance of conversational implicature the speaker conveys 
information in addition to the literal sense of the utterance. For example 
consider the following conversation: A. Do you walk to school? B. I live in the 
suburbs. Here A learns not only the B does not walk to school but additionally 
that her home in the suburbs is too far away to walk to school. In cases of irony 
the speaker does not convey additional information, rather information is 
substituted for the literal sense. Saying "Nice Day!" during a storm does not 
give any extra information, instead it replaces the literal sense of a declaration 
like "What horrible weather!". 
A further problem with Grice's account of irony according to Sperber and 
Wilson lies in the reasons for choosing the ironical substitute for the literal 
sense. These reasons are contained in the distinction between the Use and 
Mention of an utterance. The use of an expression involves reference to what 
the expression refers to, along with making an assertion, asking a question, etc. 
For example saying "Nice Day" on a nice day is a use of the expression as it 
refers to the nice day outside. Mention on the other hand involves reference 
only to the expression itself, as in the sentence - The above paragraph contains 
the words 'nice day'. In the case of irony when I say such during a storm I am 
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not referring to the day at hand. Rather I am mentioning the expression, i.e. the 
referent for this utterance is another utterance, either explicit as when my wife 
said five minutes earlier "I hope the weather is nice." or implicit as when I merely 
thought the same thing at the same time. Either way the utterance is an ironic 
echo of an earlier expression and it is the earlier expression which is being 
commented on, not the state of the world or some possible world. The concepts 
of mention theory will return when instances of humorous discourse are viewed, 
but for now it is pertinent to move on as neither Grice, Green nor Sperber and 
Wilson treat the relation of these principles and theories to humor. 
Norrick ( 1994) on the other hand specifically raises the question of 
humorous intent in the communicative exchange. The ultimate purpose Norrick 
has with this work is to further the description of the semantics and syntax of 
humor by investigating its interpersonal and social dimensions in real life 
contexts. He believes that close attention to humor in everyday talk will lead to 
a description of humorous interaction accounting for its position in the 
organization of conversation. In his view this must relate humor to social 
discourse in light of the principles of politeness and cooperation. Norrick ties 
humor intimately to the context of utterance. That means that the physical 
setting, the participants, and their reasons for being together are all a part of the 
process. The interaction of humor and context also extends into the spheres of 
social roles, history (of locale and participants), cultural knowledge, etc. 
Norrick's discourse analysis illustrates humor's effect on the organization 
of conversations. He concludes that humor is often involved in the very basis of 
micro-organization, as in spontaneous puns in an utterance pair. This 
involvement is seen to often progress to higher levels of organization in such 
areas as openings, closings, topic shifts and the alignment of participants. 
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Humor can even become the primary organizational principle in conversation, 
as in bantering and joke telling sessions. 
On the function of humor in conversation, Norrick (1993) shows how 
humor can establish rapport via anecdote swapping and joking relationships. 
Humor's capacity to produce animosity through mocking, sarcasm and personal 
attack is also treated. 
Though Norrick's descriptions of humor in social interaction are very 
thorough, they do not attempt to resolve the issues involved in how we are able 
to interpret humor in the light of its placement in the overall discourse. That is to 
say the insertion of humorous dialogue in the fabric of an otherwise serious 
conversation is very often an instance in which there is no formal cohesion 
between the overall context and the humorous piece. This is easily seen 
whenever someone spontaeously utters a pun. In order to account for the 
recognizability and interpretability of cases of humorous use, other aspects of 
humor research are necessary. 
Gruner (1978) points out that theorists have long believed that the 
establishment of a 'play frame' is necessary for the maximum reception and 
enjoyment of humor. That is to say the humorous instance must be preceded by 
the explicit setting aside of the piece in question from the remainder of the 
overall context at hand. Several of the numerous empirical studies cited in his 
work support exactly this claim. For example, Kennedy tested this proposition 
with a series of speeches given at the University of Michigan to various groups 
of students. In instances where a speech was explicitly given a 'play frame' (by 
warning the students that many jokes were coming their way and that they 
should be sure to laugh) the humor ratings as assessed by the students in 
questionnaires were considerably higher than in those case without an explicit 
27 
'play frame' having been created. However, as Gruner states, no attempt was 
made to describe how the humorous speeches given without explicitly 
demarking the situation as a 'play frame' were received as humorous at all. All 
that can be said is that the students found the other speeches more amusing, 
not that these were unfunny. 
Another study investigating the reception of humor was conducted by H. 
Giles et. al. (1975). Its purpose was to determine whether and in what ways the 
linguistic strategies a person employs differ from encoding a serious and a 
humorous message. 25 British male students aged between 18 and 28 were 
judged by three volunteer undergraduate students on their style of speaking 
when reading three texts all of the same length and written by the same author. 
The three texts comprised 2 serious and one humorous piece. The results 
showed that when relating the humorous piece more non-standard language, 
less precise enunciation and more fluency in tempo and pitch were evidenced. 
Unlike Kennedy's above mentioned study, no explicit play frame was 
established to guide the judges in their assessments. This would seem to 
indicate that even when no explicit play frame is created, the relater of a 
humorous piece unconsciously creates a frame in order to enhance the 
receptivity of the humorous piece. 
While such studies are convincing in supporting the argument that the 
creation of a 'play frame' considerably affects the reception (i.e. understanding) 
of humor, they are not sufficient for describing how we are able to correctly 
interpret an utterance as humorous when no such 'play frame' has recognizably 
been established, for example in a dead pan delivery. The comedy of 
performers like Bob Newhart serves as a good example. In his sitcom of the 
early 80's there is an episode where three very backwoods brothers are 
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introduced to the characters and the audience. The lead brother introduces the 
trio in a stone face with the words "Hi! My name's Larry and this is my brother 
Darrell and this is my other brother Darrell. " , resulting in a very funny moment. 
Even though the audience knows that the show is supposed to be funny, on first 
airing they do not know when the jokes will come, nor from whom. How then 
do we understand when to laugh? 
To account for the recognition of humorous utterances as such, it seems 
necessary to look into further aspects of humor research. Bateson, (1969) like 
many others, argues that the conventions of communication, not only humorous 
types, differ from culture to culture. He states that the informational content of a 
joke is to be found on the surface, whereas other types of content are implicit in 
the background. When the point of a joke is reached this background material 
is brought into attention touching off a paradox or contradiction. An excellent 
example of background information being brought to the fore, is the joke 
concerning partner swapping. Two young couples who have known each other 
for a white breech the subject and decide to try it. The next weekend after a wild 
night of love making one of the wives turns to her new partner and says I 
wonder how the boys are doing. When the teller first begins to relate the joke 
the background information which is brought to the fore is something to the 
effect of 'swinging couples' trading partners on a heterosexual basis. However 
as the joke finishes a contradiction to our common, stereotyped background 
belief is thrown upon us. Bateson argues that such paradoxes are the 
prototypic paradigm of humor. In the psychology of humor what Bateson terms 
paradox or contradiction, others choose to name incongruity. 
Nerhardt (1975) see's incongruity as a necessary ingredient for 
perceiving an utterance as an attempt at humor. One must be able to infer the 
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presence of incongruous elements in order to designate an instance of 
discourse as humorous. According to the author in such an instance 
expectations based on experience are tied to the perception of the discourse 
and the greater the divergence of the discourse piece from the expectation, the 
funnier the piece is perceived to be. 
Oring (1989) in probing the differences between jokes and humorous 
tales also argues that humor is dependent on the discernment of an appropriate 
incongruity. He describes the conditions necessary for humor recognition as 
being a compatibility, full or in part, of two differing scripts which in some way 
are opposites. In perceiving this incongruity the listener is forced to make a 
cognitive reorganization, be it abrupt as caused by punch lines in jokes or less 
so in the case of humorous tales. In both, however, a fine line is drawn between 
too overtly displaying the incongruity and masking it so much that the listener 
becomes unable to discover it. 
Shultz (1975) agrees in part with these assessments but believes that 
they do not go far enough. Incongruity does indeed account for the most 
obvious structural feature of jokes, i.e. the punch line, but in contrast to simple 
nonsense the incongruity of humor must be resolvable. Of course, one must 
first recognize the incongruity , but then the information containing the 
resolution must also be processed and processable. Arguing that much of the 
incongruity responsible for humor lies in linguistic ambiguity, Shultz gives two 
examples, one of lexical and the other of phonological ambiguity. Again in 
order to perceive these as humorous one must first recognize the ambiguity. Ex 
1: Attributed to Groucho Marx: "I ought to join a club, and beat you over the head 
with it (p. 13)." Here the ambiguity lies in the two meanings of the word club. Ex 
2: "Teacher to student: Make a sentence using the phrase 'bitter end'. Student: 
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A dog chased a cat and bitter end (p. 13)." In this example the pronunciation of 
the phrase as written and as 'bit her end' illustrate the ambiguity. 
Shultz continues by arguing that linguistic ambiguity often goes 
unnoticed unless one happens to be looking for it. This claim supports Gruner's 
belief that the establishment of a play frame enhances the receptivity of humor. 
Following up on this line of reasoning, Rothbart (1975) also argues that it 
is not incongruity itself which leads to humor, but rather the manner in which it is 
resolved. In a study with children of kindergarten age, the author shows how 
the same incongruous actions used by different people in different contexts can 
lead not only to humor but also to fear. This she argues is partially due the the 
suddenness and intensity of the stimulus. According to her a true humor 
response requires: 1. a concept, 2. awareness that the stimulus violates the 
concept and 3. confidence in the impossibility or improbability of the stimulus 
occurring as depicted. It is this last requirement which separates humor from 
fear. Slapstick is an excellent example of the fine line between a humorous and 
fearful response. Upon seeing a person take a nasty spill on the street we 
laugh when we realize that the individual has incurred no injury. If on the other 
hand it looks as if the person has indeed hurt themselves then only the 
sociopath would find this funny. 
Agreeing with Rothbart's interpretation, Forobosco (1992) defines 
incongruity as divergence from the cognitive model of reference, and resolution 
as cognitive mastery, both of which are essential to the humor process. This 
definition is more than reminiscent of the CP and Sperber and Wilson's search 
for optimal relevance. For what is incongruity in these terms but the recognition 
of a flout or violation of the CP generating implicature and resolution the 
attainment of optimal relevance. 
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Pepicello (1987) likewise explores ambiguity as a source of humor. His 
claim is that in riddles and jokes an ambiguous word or phrase can be seen as 
belonging to two or more frames of reference simultaneously, depending on the 
interpretation forced upon it. The listener is deprived of the necessary 
information to correctly choose the context which focuses on the 'right' meaning. 
This is done consciously by the speaker, who in the case of riddles most often 
covertly provides the necessary link, but in the case of jokes withholds it 
altogether. This withholding or masking of pertinent information can be 
described as a violation of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity and/or Manner. The 
children's riddle "What's black and white and read all over?" is a good 
illustration of this masking of vital information. When spoken the listener is led 
to understand that the color red is meant and only upon hearing the answer to 
the riddle is the listener made aware of the real interpretation. As mentioned 
previously the concepts of incongruity and resolution are more precisely 
described in relation to the CP. Therefore it is necessary to return to Grice's CP, 
the role it plays in the recognition of humor and its place in literary humor. 
Lewis ( 1989) delves into the application of humor research to the field of 
literary interpretation. It is his contention that no single formula will ever be 
found to describe the myriad interactions of factors found in humor. And for 
humor criticism to continue to speak of a single, overarching social or 
psychological view of humor is anachronistic because of the modern 
multidisciplinary nature of the modern field of humor research. He points to the 
established insights gained in the last two decades in order to convince critics 
of literary humor to broaden their approaches toward humor in literature. 
According to Lewis the established insights are: 1. Humor originates in the 
perception of an incongruity. 2. Humor appreciation is a two stage process; 
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perception then resolution of incongruity. 3. Humor is a non-serious response 
to an incongruous stimulus. 4. The perception of humor is subjective, relying on 
the perciever's background knowledge, expectations, values and norms and it 
is also variable within the same person over time. 5. the creation of humor and 
its use are based on perceptions of social power. 
O'Neill (1987) also deals with humor in literature but from the perspective 
that any literary text is to be viewed as a game affording both author and reader 
the possibility of producing endless meanings and relationships. This impulse 
he claims is inherent to fiction as a play frame is established by the fictive world 
projection necessary to literature. As every piece of fiction establishes a play 
frame, theret ore all fiction is potentially humorous. His argument is that this is 
due to the fact that in every nascent humor situation there is a given world of 
discourse in which a certain order obtains. A possible world is then 
superimposed on or juxtaposed to this world leading to potentially actualizable 
humor. This possible world projection allows the receiver to play along and 
concentrate on the incongruities thereby creating not only a play text but also a 
humor text. 
With Pratt (1981) the discussion now turns to the specific role that the CP 
plays in literature. In her argument for using the CP to reconstruct our model of 
the world when reading a piece of literature, Pratt states that the only type of 
non-fulfillment which can take place from the writer's perspective is intentional. 
Moreover, the only type of intentional non-fulfillment taking place in literary 
situations is flouting. 
Her argument begins with unintentional failures in conversation. 
Speakers violate the maxim of quantity by getting carried away. And making 
mistakes, becoming confused and babbling all violate the maxim of quality. The 
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manner maxim is violated every time someone utters an unintentional pun and 
relevance falls with every non-sequitor that is said. These do not jeopardize the 
CP as the speaker is still trying to make the contribution pertinent to the 
exchange. Due to turn taking rules in conversation this is not all that serious 
and most infractions can be cleared up. 
In writing, however, this is not the case. Pratt contends that it also is not 
that serious. Unintentional failures are weeded out in the writing, editing and 
publishing processes behind a work of fiction. Intentional failures, other than 
floutings, are likewise not to be found in written discourse. Simply by writing the 
author 'opts in' and a quiet violation that might mislead could never be 
discovered, unless it were part of the plot of a mystery and then in a good 
mystery there should be enough clues for the observant reader to uncover it. 
Clashes also are not possible. Any clash that might have taken place the 
author has resolved in the mere act of writing. Of course any character in a 
fictional piece may unintentionally fail to observe a maxim. It is also quite 
possible that a character would 'opt out', quietly violate or find a clash in the CP. 
Nevertheless, Pratt argues that from the point of view of the writer, these are all 
intentional floutings of the CP. 
For one example Pratt uses the third and fourth sentences of Sterne's 
Life and Opinions of Tristam Shandy (1760). 
Believe me, good folks, this is not so inconsiderable a thing as many of 
you may think it; - you have all, I dare say, heard of the animal spirits, as how 
they are transferred from father to son, &c., &c., - and a great deal to that 
purpose: - Well, you may take my word, that nine parts in ten of a man's sense 
or his nonsense, his successes and miscarriages in this world depend on their 
motions and activity, and the different tracks and trains you put them on, so that 
when they are once set a-going, whether right or wrong, •tis not a halfpenny 
matter, - away they go cluttering like hey-go-mad; and by making a road of it, as 
plain and as smooth as a garden walk, which, when they are once used to, the 
Devil himself sometimes shall not be able to drive them off it. Pray, my dear, 
quoth my mother, have you not forgot to wind up the clock? (p. 385). 
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The reader knows that this is a piece of fiction. Therefore, he brings with him 
the knowledge of the rules of narration and written discourse only to encounter 
violations of the maxims of Manner and Quantity. In respect to Manner, the text 
is full of colloquialisms and other expressions of spoken discourse, and due to 
the large amount of repeated phrases (the many couplets), the maxim of 
quantity is abused. 
However, as Pratt points out, the reader of Tristam Shandy does not for 
one moment believe that Sterne is not cooperating. Rather the contrast 
between what the reader expects in regard to manner and quantity and what he 
gets, is related to Sterne's display-producing intent. That is to say that the 
reader at this stage is unclear as to whether the character Shandy is 
intentionally failing to fulfill the maxims or no, but from the point of view of 
Sterne, the reader recognizes the intent as an attempt at humor. The fictional 
Shandy could be quietly violating the CP, but according to Pratt, Sterne cannot. 
Hancher (1983) also investigates the role of the CP in literature. Utilizing 
Carroll's Alice in Wonderland, Hancher, like many others, argues that humor is 
a matter of breaking the rules, whatever those rules might be. And many 
instances of humor turn on the rules of pragmatics. He claims that among 
pragmatic principles, Grice's CP is a useful model and that all of the maxims 
come to play in this text. Hancher merely outlines a Gricean model of humor in 
literature, while Martinich in treating the same text does a much more extensive 
job. 
Martinich (1981) begins with Alice's well known run-in with Humpty 
Dumpty to illustrate the notion that saying and meaning are not the same thing. 
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He goes on to discuss Grice's division of conversation into 1. what the speaker 
says, 2. what he/she conventionally implies, and 3. what he/she 
conversationally implies, claiming that much humor trades on the distinction 
between these three. The tea party segment is then viewed in order to illustrate 
this claim. 
"March Hare - Take some more tea! 
Alice - I've had nothing yet, so I can't take more. 
Mad Hatter - You mean you can't take 'less'. It's very easy to take more 
than nothing (p. 28)." 
The humor of the sequence resides in the Hare's 'saying' that Alice should take 
more tea than she has, but 'conversationally implying' that she has already had 
some. This is a blatant violation of the maxim of Quality, but it is done on the 
part of a character not the author, as Carroll obviously means his audience to 
recognize the infraction. 
Dolitsky (1992) however, convincingly argues that it is the very nature of 
humor to violate the CP. Beginning her argument with the truism that humor is 
lost when explained, she postulates that the funniness of humor resides in the 
unsaid aspects of humorous communication. There are two main aspects of the 
unsaid in humor: "1. The rules for felicitous communication governing the 
choice and interpretation of the said, such that the unsaid will also be 
transmitted. Clear example of this are any cases of ordinary conversational 
implicature. and 2. The societal rules governing the behavior of its members 
(pg.34)." Once these rules have been learned they are internalized, becoming 
part of the common knowledge of a community. Humor, however, treats all 
rules as made to be broken. Though recognizing Grice's CP as the basis for 
communication, the author goes on to discuss that in any instance of humorous 
discourse the speaker leads the listener on to invoke the rules of pertinence 
knowing all the while that they do not apply to the discourse at hand. The 
humorous effect comes when the listener realizes this. 
One method of achieving this is through shared world knowledge. 
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Scripts, according to Green (1989), are standard, predetermined, stereotyped 
sequences of events defining a well known situation, are part of any person's 
world knowledge. In humor scripts are often called up only later to be shown 
not to apply. For example: Two friends are chatting and one tells the other that 
he has joined a choral society. When asked where they practice the man 
replies that they practice singing after they go out drinking when they wander 
back home. A good joke teller would first describe this situation such that the 
listeners would conjure up a picture of 'choral societies' far removed from 
drunks returning home only to finally show that such a picture does not apply to 
this story at all. Dolitsky concludes by stating that humor transgresses the CP 
by leading the listener towards the wrong interpretation, as in any punch line, 
the laws of how we believe the world to be, seen every time we suspend our 
disbelief and societal rules, for example in sexual humor where taboos are 
circumvented. 
Attardo (1993) theorizes how humor violates the CP, resulting in an 
apparent loss of inferential possibilities. He argues that the connections 
between humor and the violations of the conversational maxims support the 
claim that humor suspends the communicative presumption. In showing how 
this is the case, he uses examples of violations of all the maxims which 
conceivably could result in humor. One particularly good example is the 
violation of the maxim of manner attributed to W.C. Fields during an interview. It 
is as follows: Do you believe in clubs for young men? Only when kindness fails. 
This example violates the sub maxim ' avoid ambiguity' by deliberately playing 
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on just that to make a pun. Attardo contends that such an infraction is not an 
instance of flouting a maxim, nor is it the fulfilling of one maxim in order to avoid 
a clash with another. There is no way to interpret the retort, through a series of 
inferences common to "normal" implicature, into somehow conforming to the 
maxim. Neither can an interpretation come from a clash with another maxim. 
Compare the above pun with the following example of conversational 
implicature generated in an instance of non-humorous discourse. 
What time did Bob get home? 
The bars had already closed. 
Through inferences such as, the person is still cooperating, the seeming 
irrelevancy is deliberate and intended to be recognized, and the irrelevancy 
somehow really does conform to the maxim of relevance, we consequently 
interpret that Bob got home late. No "normal" series of inferences can account 
for the humorous interpretation of Field's retort. How would one go? Field is 
indeed cooperating and though his remark on the surface seems irrelevant it 
truly is not. Still it is not an answer to the question so Fields must have 
misunderstood the intent of the interviewer. This chain and any like it leads 
anywhere but to a humorous response. 
Nevertheless, humor does work in interpersonal exchanges. In order to 
better describe this Attardo treats the problem via three theories in humor 
research. 1. a strong mention theory, 2. a weak mention theory and 3. a 
separate CP for humor. The first two directly address the distinction in inference 
types between humorous and non-humorous utterances 
The mention theory of humor, as outlined by Attardo, hinges on the 
argument that the violation of the CP is not actual, but only an enactment 
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performed by the instigator of the humorous utterance. Therefore is it necessary 
to return to mention theory and its advocates in order to determine whether it 
can account for the recognition of an utterance as humorous. 
As previously discussed Sperber and Wilson describe the mentioning of 
an expression as involving a reference to the expression itself. For example 
mention theory is used to distinguish an utterance like "the dog runs" from the 
mention thereof as in "this example contains the word dog". And as already 
seen it is this type of mention which accounts for the echoic reference in irony. 
Yamaguchi (1987) uses mention theory to propose that the narrator of a 
humorous text avoids violating the CP by passing on any such violation to one 
of the characters in the text, thereby granting the character great freedom in 
transgressing the maxims of the CP. Thus the narrator merely mentions a 
violation as it is in reality only a representation of the true violation committed by 
the character. Or in other words the narrator's violation is an echo of the 
character's. A good illustration for this is the previously seen analysis of Alice in 
Wonderland done by Martinich. The March Hare's offer to Alice of 'more' tea, 
when she has had none, is a clear violation of the maxim of Quality. However, 
the violation is attributed to the character, and Carroll merely mentions it. 
This position however is untenable as Dolitsky has convincingly shown 
that the narrator is indeed responsible for violating at least the maxim of 
Quantity by withholding needed information, or Quality by having the listener 
invoke scripts for the purpose of deliberately leading said listeners to the wrong 
interpretation. In the March Hare and Alice example, if the Hare's last line were 
omitted, then the reader would be unable to interpret the exchange as Carroll 
intends. And this would in turn be tantamount to a joke without a punch line. It 
seems less easy to see than in cases of non-literary humor, but the author is 
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leading us down the wrong path. It is not until the scene is played out in full that 
we get the joke. That is to say that Carroll withholds vital information. He also 
has us invoke a stereotypical, normal tea party scenario for the purpose of 
showing that this is anything but normal. This is how incongruity/CP violations 
are generated in humor. To achieve its intended effect humor must often keep 
something back until the end. Otherwise there would be no punch lines nor 
surprise endings to stories and riddles would not exist. 
Attardo (1994) outlines another argument which a proponent of mention 
theory would be likely to make in the case of humor. The position would claim 
that jokes are texts representing a violation of one or more of the G ricean 
maxims which in reality are not, as the 'violation' occurs at the metalinguistic 
level thus making it acceptable. The argument here is that when viewed 
metalinguistically the 'violation' is no longer problematic much the same way 
that a normally unacceptable sentence such as Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously when viewed in this manner is also not problematic. Even though this 
allows for the possibility of infinite regression, Attardo's criticism is that it simply 
does not account for all types of humor. In his opinion the most telling problem 
is in cases of surprise punch lines. For example consider a weak joke like: 
"Have you heard the latest news? (slight pause) No? Well, neither have I." In 
such instances it cannot really be argued that the speaker is mentioning the 
utterance, as the sole purpose is to fool the listener into believing that a 'normal' 
non-humorous mode of discourse is in operation. Therefore Attardo continues, 
if violations of the CP are responsible for some types of humor even in the 
framework of mention theory and since an account of humor can be derived 
without mention theory, then there is no need to postulate its operation in the 
realm of humor. 
Attardo proposes a hierarchy of CP's as an acceptable account of how 
humorous utterances are recognizably perceived as such even though they 
violate the CP. Though one would expect a violation of the CP to render any 
utterance non-cooperative or be perceived as a lie, in truth humor is usually 
understood for what it is, namely a non-serious mode of communication. In 
order to explain how this can be the case Attardo argues that after a listener 
realizes that he/she has been mislead (i.e. a violation of a Gricean maxim has 
taken place) that person will backtrack, reinterpret the information via 'humor 
maxims', change to a non-serious mode of communication and then react 
accordingly. It is necessary to distinguish between the first and second 
interpretations of the piece of humor, as it is the latter through the 'humor' CP 
which allows for the suspension of disbelief. 
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Raskin and Attardo (1994) in contending that humor does not follow 
Grice's CP, define three attitudes toward the CP: 1. an utterance may both 
superficially and essentially abide by the maxims, 2. it may only essentially 
honor the maxims, i.e. it may flout one conspicuously in order to honor another 
more strongly, and 3. it may be devoid of cooperation altogether, as in cases of 
tying. The authors argue that instances of humor, none of these conditions 
apply, because humor routinely violates the maxim of quality. The speaker 
does not say what he believes in any normal sense of the word; instead the 
speaker is engaged in non-bona-fide communication, where bona-fide 
communication is the mandatory fulfillment of the maxims of the CP. When a 
speaker abandons bona-fide discourse and the hearer recognizes it, then it 
would seem that the hearer is limited to processing only the literal meaning and 
is barred from making any inferences pertaining to the truth value of the 
statement. 
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Nevertheless, non-bona-fide communication is successful on a massive 
scale in instances of humor. Raskin and Attardo state that this is possible only 
because humor is ruled by a CP of its own. 
Humor occurs in four settings created by the combination of the 
possibilities contained in 1. and 2. below. 
1 a. The speaker makes the joke unintentionally. 
1 b. The speaker makes the joke intentionally. 
2a. The hearer doesn't expect the joke. 
2b. The hearer expects the joke. 
In the case of 1 a the speaker intends bona-fide communication and is unaware 
of the humorous interpretation, whereas in 1 b the humor is known and 
intended. In 2a the hearer, not expecting a joke, will initially try to interpret the 
utterance as bona-fide and only upon failing will he activate a non-bona-fide 
mode. In 2b the hearer will initially utilize a non-bona-fide mode of interpretation 
without first having to activate the bona-fide mode. This accounts for the higher 
rate of reception and enjoyment of humor when a play frame has been 
established. 
Raskin and Attardo claim that non-bona-fide communication must involve 
a CP distinct from Grice's. Their CP for humor contains the following maxims: 
1. Quantity- Give as much information as is necessary for the joke. 
2. Quality - Say only what is consistent with the world of the joke. 
3. Relation - Say only what is relevant to the joke. 
4. Manner - Tell the joke efficiently. 
In situations where the both the speaker and hearer are attuned to the 
joke, a play frame exists, the parties abide by these maxims immediately. When 
the pair is not in congruence, i.e. the joke is either unintended or unexpected, 
the speaker and/or hearer must switch to a non-bona-fide mode of 
communication, and as humor is a more easily processable realignment of a 
model of the world, than say lying or insanity is, the participants choose the 
maxims of the humor CP. 
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Next, the authors investigate relevant features of jokes in their General 
Theory of Verbal Humor. This expands their earlier semantic script theory of 
humor, whose main hypothesis was that a text can be characterized as a joke 
carrying text if it is compatible, fully or in part, with two different opposing scripts. 
For example, if script one is normal, possible or good, then script two is 
abnormal, impossible or bad. This can be easily seen in what are called Light 
Bulb Jokes, e.g. How many sorority girls does it take to screw in a light bulb? 
Answer - 5, four to stand around scratching their heads and one to call daddy. 
Here the script oppositions are normal/abnormal smart/dumb. 
In expanding this theory the authors argue that script oppositions (SO) 
are but one of the six knowledge resources (KR) which inform a joke. The 
second is language (LA), the actual wording of a text. This determines not only 
the particular phrasing, but also the placement of functional elements in the 
joke, for example the punch line. In this resource paraphrasing accounts for the 
type of variation, as the above light bulb joke could essentially be told in many 
different ways. Another resource is the logical mechanism (LM), the playful 
logic that doesn't hold outside of the world of the joke and triggers the non-
bona-fide mode. The LM accounts for the manner of linking the scripts together. 
This can be a juxtaposition, false analogy or a garden-path joke. Raskin and 
Attardo give the following joke to illustrate. 
"Madonna does not have it, the Pope has it but doesn't use it, Bush has a 
short one, Gorbachev has a long one. What is it? Not what you think - shame on 
you! A Last name (p. 52)." 
43 
This joke leads us deliberately to an interpretation which ultimately proves to be 
wrong. But such is the logic of the joke that we are forced to reach the 
interpretation intended. 
Fourthly, there is the target (TA), or butt of the joke. Sometimes this 
seems to be an empty category, as in cases of riddles or where there is no 
aggression. For example, it is difficult to find a target in the following children's 
joke. What's big, red and eats rocks? Answer - A big, red rock-eater. But with 
ethnic, race and sex jokes, the targets are obvious. Other jokes find humanity 
itself a proper butt for their humor, and it is perhaps these which have greater 
resonance. Great literary humorists, such as Twain and Thurber, are great due 
to their ability to sense and invoke the funny, inherent to the human condition. 
The next knowledge resource is the narrative strategy (NS) of the joke. 
This is the vehicle of the joke and it can be rigid, as with knock-knock jokes (it's 
not a knock-knock joke without the knocks), or as flexible as the rules of literary 
license allow. Lastly, there is the situation (SI), the activity in the joke. Changing 
light bulbs and crossing roads are two good examples. 
To better illustrate the mapping out of a joke via these knowledge 
resources, consider the above light bulb joke. For the resource LA - the 
wording as above, NS - question/answer, SI - changing a light bulb, LM -
independence/appeal to authority, TA - sorority girls,SO - normal/ abnormal or 
more specifically smart/dumb. This model anchors humor outside of Grice's CP. 
The creation of deliberate ambiguities in LA, the activation of unrealistic scripts 
in TA, SI, and SO, and deliberate deception in NS and LM cause humor to be 
viewed as being non-bona-fide. And that is to say that humor abuses not only 
the letter but also the spirit of Grice's CP. 
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Taking this general theory of humor, one is able to analyze our capacity 
to recognize humor in literary works with much more sophistication than with 
incongruity theory or with Grice's maxims alone. A detailed comparative 
analysis of a short story by Mark Twain will illustrate the greater dimensions of 
Raskin and Attardo's theory. 
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Chapter 3 
A Comparative Analysis of Twain's "My Watch" 
I. Twain and Typology 
One of the earlier trends in humor research was the classification of 
certain types of humor. This was not without merit as we routinely partition the 
general term humor into jokes, riddles, puns, bon mots, funny tales and so on. 
One problem with this is that the properties or features of each type are not 
unique to that type. Riddles often take the form of a question, but they need not. 
And although jokes are not normally questions, there is no rule that they cannot 
be. Puns are based on ambiguity, but jokes and riddles both can also revolve 
around ambiguous items. Often classif atory schemes would demarcate humor 
in terms of the target of the funny piece. There are ethnic jokes and sexist jokes, 
and with some of these it is easy to type by targets. But what of the limerick: 
There once was a Senator from Mass., 
Who wanted a fine piece of ass. 
He lucked up and found her, 
Then f---ed up and drowned her, 
And now his fine future is past. 
This clearly is political, aimed at a well known Democratic politician. Also it is 
very sexist from a feminist point of view. So just as overlapping features are a 
problem for creating neat sets of well-defined specific types, particular targets 
are also unable to serve as unique features that categorize humor instances. 
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Precisely this is the problem one runs into when typologically analyzing 
Twain's story "My Watch" . Literarily, it is easily a short story and a tall tale, or 
yarn, at the same time. But this hardly exhausts the explanation as to how we 
first find it funny. When told that this is a tall tale, we do learn that what is to 
come is some narrative prose piece of fiction with an amusing element or twist. 
Twain's tale of having his watch repaired, ordinarily not something intrinsically 
funny, requires a funny element in order for it to fit into this category. Therefore 
it is necessary to see what elements there are that allow this story to be 
classified amusing. 
"My beautiful new watch had run eighteen months without losing or 
gaining (p. 64)" with these words Twain first describes his trusty watch and its 
faithful workings only to tell that finally this flawless piece of machinery had 
been let to run down. With foreboding he enters a jeweler's to set the watch to 
the correct time. Up to this point the story seems no more than a usual 
occurrence, albeit somewhat overdrawn. But the humorous element begins as 
the chief jeweler insists on repairing the unbroken watch and of course simply 
makes things worse. "Next day I stepped into the chief jeweler's to set it. .. and 
the head of the establishment proceeded to set it for me. Then he said, "She is 
four minutes slow - regulator wants pushing up (p. 65)". The watch starts to gain 
time to such an extent that it "entered into November while the October leaves 
are still turning. It hurried up time, bills payable and generally leaves all other 
time pieces behind (p. 65)." Here Twain introduces elements of absurd humor, 
with absurd intended loosely. Without delving into an exact definition, absurd 
humor is that which is based on gross or extreme exaggeration of ordinary 
events. The extreme claims made by Twain concerning the watch's power to 
'control' time typify this category. Along with this are the increasingly inept and 
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bizarre attempts made by various watch~ewelry experts to correct the problem. 
The culmination of all these attempts to repair the watch occurs when Twain 
enters a watchmaker's only to find that the owner is an old steamship 
acquaintance, who was somewhat of a failure as an engineer. His solution is to 
reduce the amount of steam the watch makes by hanging a monkey wrench 
onto the safety valve. Twain, by this time completely exasperated, simply brains 
the man. "He examined all the parts carefully, just as the other watchmakers 
had done, and then ... with the same confidence of manner he said: "She makes 
too much steam - you want to hang the monkey-wrench on the safety-valve!" 
brained him on the spot, and had him buried at my own expense (p. 66-7)." 
In all of these descriptions, the watch's abilities as well as the 
repairmen's inabilities, extreme exaggeration is utilized to create a humorous 
effect. Nevertheless, the presence of this one feature hardly makes this tale an 
example of absurd humor. Exaggeration of characteristics, while certainly 
contained in absurd humor, is also found in other types of humor. Take for 
example any "Polack" joke. The crux of these jokes is to highlight the stupidity 
of this group by exaggerating the depths of dumbness. Saying it takes four 
Polacks to screw in a light bulb, three to turn the one holding the bulb, 
exaggerates in two ways. First, the difficulty in actually accomplishing the task 
is exaggerated. In real life it is naturally a one person job. This leads to the 
second exaggeration, the reason why the question is 'pertinant' regarding 
'Polacks', namely that they are stupid people. Just how dumb these people are 
becomes clear when hearing the answer. Nobody could be that dumb, so we 
describe them as dumber than the dumb. That is to say we call them stupid by 
exaggerating what stupid is. 
Nevertheless, the presence of exaggeration does not make this an 
example of absurd humor. The typologist would more readily call this an 
example of an ethnic joke. Here the target seems the more likely means of 
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classifying this piece of humor, which raises the question of of which of the 
features comprising a type should be used as a type name. Even though this 
seems an ethnic joke, if one substitutes other targets, for example feminists, 
then it could be called a sexist joke. Yet, the form obviously remains the same 
and exaggeration is still the primary means of focusing the humor. Therefore 
this feature, central to the humor of "My Watch", overlaps with other humor 
types, thereby preventing neat categories from being created. 
Using one feature such as target, to define humorous types is likewise 
problematic. If Twain had chosen another target, say newspaper editors, the 
reader would not be tempted to categorize this story as a different humor type. 
This contrasts sharply with pieces of humor such as the Polack joke, whose very 
type is defined via the target. 
Although some case can be made for reclassifying the Polack joke as a 
sexist one with the simple change of targets, ultimately this argument fails when 
analyzing Twain's short story. There is more to "My Watch" than the target 
alone. Twain's tale resonates far beyond the particular target, watch repairmen. 
It is clear to all that Twain's humor does not just deal with watches and 
repairmen, but rather tecnology and technological experts in general are poked 
fun at. Twain's story revolves around the dangers of blindly placing faith in 
authority or expert figures. Therefore the changing of targets in reality only 
serves to shift the focus of the humor without in actuality altering the humor 
itself. No, there is more to humor than simply typing it via its target. Even 
though some insight may be gained from typologies, typing something does not 
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explain what it is. Knowing that a piece of humor contains certain features, not 
unique and not altogether necessary to that type, cannot account for how we 
recognize it as a piece of humor. We do not call 11 My Watch" funny only because 
of the use of exaggeration, the targeting of technical experts or the story format. 
II. The Social Nature of "My Watch" 
As seen in chapters one and two, Norrick (1974) analyzes the social 
nature of humor, and describes the mechanisms by which humor affects group 
identification. As alluded to previously, both the Polack joke and Twain's tale 
contain social/functional elements that help to inform the humor. This 
theoretical approach attempts to describe what humor does rather than what it 
is. Because "My Watch" pokes fun at watch repairmen in particular and 
technical experts in general, the reader quickly sees that two differing social 
groups are being defined, namely experts and the laity. This serves to highlight 
society's ever increasing need to appeal to authority figures in our daily lives. 
Some 300 years after the birth of science, the increasing demand for technical 
expertise was not lost on Twain. Twain was also equally aware of ordinary men 
and women coming to allow techno-gadgets to rule our lives. These two points 
seem to be the main thrust of the story. Twain uses humor to describe a society 
that has become and is continuing to become more reliant on technological 
advancements, the workings of which it itself is ignorant. This in turn has led to 
a partitioning of that self-same society into those who understand and those 
who do not. 
After the initial 'repair' of the watch, Twain's depiction of its crazy working 
and its power over time illustrate the degree to which we have allowed 
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technology to rule our lives. By running so fast, "it hurried up house rent. ... in 
such a ruinous way that I couldn't abide it (p. 65)" the watch becomes an absurd 
creation, thus illustrating just how far removed society is from the rhythms of 
nature. In Twain's time, as well as in our own, the reader easily appreciates the 
absurdity of allowing artificial time to govern our existence. By exaggerating the 
amount of control clock time actually has over us, Twain makes us realize the 
degree of control we have given the clock. 
The portrayal of the repairmen equals the absurd workings of the watch. 
Twain begins with a not unrealistic picture of a technical expert. His first jeweler 
sees Twain and immediately begins to diagnose problems without ever 
consulting Twain. Every reader should recognize in this some similar incident 
from their own lives when a so-called expert never even bothered to ask what 
the problem was. We all also remember occasions when these experts botched 
the job far worse than the original problem. Twain quickly introduces other 
repairmen each significantly more inept than the previous one. This culminates 
in the ex-steamboat engineer who Twain kills. His final frustrating encounter 
speaks as loudly today as it did when it was written. 
Although we can identify with Twain, the story also reminds us of the 
depth of our dependence on those who are in the know. One hundred years 
after the advent of the industrial revolution, Twain recognized how deep this 
dependence ran. The ease that technological advancement brings a society is 
soon taken for granted. Nameless people create, produce and yes repair these 
wonders, and we never even question the origin of these things nor the nature 
and knowledge of this separate people. That is until something goes wrong 
with one of our gadgets. It is at this point that we become aware of our 
ignorance of artificial objects which have become necessities. There are others 
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possessing the required knowledge whom we must seek out. And we are at 
their mercy. They have their own language that we cannot understand. Twain 
illustrates this many times, for example " He said the king-bolt. was broken. I 
said I was glad it was nothing more serious. To tell the plain truth, I had no idea 
what a king bolt was, but I did not choose to appear ignorant to a stranger 
(p.66)." Twain must trust his judgment, as we all do when we appeal to an 
authority who we believe has_ more knowledge and expertise than we possess. 
This actual separation of groups in real society is laughed at in the story. 
By smiling at Twain's helplessness at the hands of his experts, we come to see 
more clearly our own helplessness. At the end of the tale Twain finally asserts 
himself, he takes action. In clubbing his old engineer buddy he is telling the 
reader to symbolically do the same. Rather than blindly placing trust in experts, 
we should break down the division of the two groups by breaking down the 
knowledge barrier and trusting unto ourselves. 
Clearly a social functionalist viewing of the humor contained in this story 
has much to offer the humor researcher. However, it is equally clear that this 
theoretical approach makes no attempt at explaining what humor is, or how we 
recognize it for what it is. The whole basis of such an analysis begins by taking 
the humor for granted. The question asked is more to the tune of: this is a funny 
story, so what does the humor do? not how de we know this is intended as 
humorous? Concentrating solely (at the macro-level) on the identification of 
social group formation and on the power interactions at play between differing 
groups necessitates the narrowing of focus to the point where humor 
recognition is almost completely beyond its scope. Thus, even though a social-
functional interpretation of the humor in this story will offer much insight into the 
role humor plays in society, like typologies it will not account for humor. 
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Ill. "My Watch" and the Incongruous 
Incongruity theory has attempted to address the lack of focusing on 
recognition by concentrating on the perceived presence of two opposing scripts 
or paradoxical pairs. As Nerhardt (1975) argues, the perception of incongruity 
is necessary for the perception of humor. Unfortunately, this is as far as 
Nerhardt goes. However, Rothbart (1975) claims that the manner of 
incongruity's resolution is equally significant when perceiving humor. Although 
her focus was on young children in their perception of an event as either 
humorous or frightening, her central point that the way we resolve incongruity 
greatly influences our reaction seems valid. Not only might we resolve 
incongruity in terms of fright, but anger could also be our reaction. And of 
course one must actually be able to resolve the incongruity. It seems that to get 
a joke it is necessary not only to see the pieces that do not fit but one must make 
them fit together anyway. There are even jokes that revolve around the need for 
resolvability. In the mid 1980's in West Germany the Anti-Witz or anti-joke was 
making its rounds among the high schools. One example translated into 
English is: I went to the bakery yesterday and the baker asked me if I wanted 
white or wheat bread. I said it didn't matter, because I rode my bike. The 
incongruous elements of buying bread and riding bikes are completely 
unresolvable as the latter simply does not connect to the former. However, 15 
year old German girls would erupt in laughter as this utter lack of connection, or 
unresolvability, was the entire point. 
An analysis of Twain's story in the light of incongruity theory focuses on 
the opposition between the watch of the story controlling time and actual 
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watches measuring it. Equally stressed is the ability of real-life technical 
experts to generally do their jobs well versus Twain's incompetent repairmen. 
No less significant remains the need to resolve these incongruities in a manner 
that leads to humor. Lastly, the reader must recognize and resolve the actions 
of Twain the character in contrast to the actions of real-life people in similar 
situations. 
None of these three incongruities are all that difficult to spot. "After being 
cleaned and oiled, and regulated, my watch slowed down to that degree that it 
ticked like a tolling bell ... I gradually drifted back into yesterday, then day before, 
then into last week (p. 65). 11 Twain's wild portrayal of the watch after the first 
repair and its increasingly insane functioning with each subsequent repair is 
automatically compared with the workings of ordinary watches and clocks. 
They may run down, run fast or slow, or stop running altogether, but they 
certainly never "wheeze and bark and kick back like muskets (p. 65). 11 They do 
not control the passage of real time and cannot literally speed up bills payable. 
The reader needs no special clues to recognize the differing nature of Twain's 
watch from that of all real ones. This opposing pair could well be placed under 
the rubric normal/abnormal. 
Also very easy to recognize is the incongruous nature of Twain's experts 
with respect to real world technicians. Even though everyone has some story 
about a so-called expert who proved to be inept, we nonetheless routinely seek 
out experts to correct problems for us when our own abilities are insufficient. 
Were experts in the real world so thoroughly and routinely incompetent as 
Twain's are, we would never dream of looking to them for solutions to our 
problems. "I went to a watchmaker again. He took it all to pieces ... After this the 
watch averaged well, but nothing more (p. 65). 11 The exaggerated inability of the 
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story's experts forces the reader to bring forth memories of real-life encounters 
to act as a counterweight in our understanding of Twain's story. Here the 
opposing pair seems to be expertise/ineptitude or good/bad. 
The last incongruous pair contained in the story centers on the actions of 
Twain the character. For fear of appearing ignorant he silently observes as 
each jeweler ruins his time piece even more. In real life many of us have also 
meekly looked on the repair jobs and said nothing because we did not want the 
depths of our ignorance known. Still, unlike Twain in the story, it is clear that the 
limits to our trust and patience would have ended much sooner. The contrast in 
the degree of faith in authority appears to fit well under the heading 
active/passive or blind trust/ critical trust. 
As Rothbart has shown, for incongruity theory to account for humor 
recognition, the fact that an incongruity be resolvable and resolved correctly 
must occupy a central position. For Rothbart the nature of this resolvability 
revolves around the possibility of occurrence. For a joke or narrative story to be 
perceived as humorous, Rothbart argues that our beliefs pertaining to the 
events of the joke/story actually coming to pass are negative. That is to say, that 
if we believe anything at all about the story in terms of truth value, we believe 
that they are not true. If we entertained thoughts that the events in Twain's story 
could possibly come about, the effect of the story and our reaction to it would be 
much different. Instead of laughing at the descriptions we would react subdued, 
taking them as a warning or an omen. We do not believe that Twain is relating 
a true story. Not only are we sure that neither the watch nor the repairmen did 
the things Twain says, we are equally positive that Twain did not kill his old 
steamship buddy. Because we recognize the opposing pairs and resolve them 
in terms of very low probability of occurrence, we interpret the story as funny. 
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There are several problems with this explanation, the most damaging 
being that it is not very explanatory. Equating humor recognition with the belief 
that events are unlikely does not address the question why we believe them 
unlikely. Also many unlikely events are not humorous. Neither does it attempt 
to differentiate between dissimilar types of unlikely events. It is true that the 
reader does not believe that Twain has described some true story, but not 
believing is obviously not the same as understanding humorous intent. This is 
doubly so when one remembers that this is a piece of prose fiction. 
In speech we can disbelieve something for many reasons. We reserve 
judgment when there is too little information and we judge negatively when 
there is contradictory information. But in the case of prose fiction we actively 
suspend disbelief and do not even attempt to judge actions, characters and 
events in terms of real world occurrences. Occupying a world of its own, the 
events in Twain's story are automatically deemed improbable in their relation to 
the real world. Incongruity theory would then of necessity have to call all 
fictional works humorous as they are all improbable. 
A related drawback to this theory is its unaccountability in differentiating 
improbable events into categories other than humorous. "King Lear' is 
certainly unlikely ever to have happen and it is by no means humorous. In fact 
every literary genre from romance to science fiction and horror to the historical 
novel all contain incongruities when viewed against the real world. Therefore a 
deeper analysis into the issue of humor recognition is necessary as incongruity 
theory remains too limited. 
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IV. "My Watch" According to the CP 
In order to better explain the nature of humor other researchers have 
adopted principles found in linguistic pragmatics, specifically the Cooperative 
Principle. As mentioned in Chapter One and more thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter Two, the CP involves the recognition of implied meaning. Crucial to 
this is the distinction between a violation of the maxims of the CP and a mere 
flout. In the case of a violation their is an intentional non-abidance of at least 
one of the four maxims (quantity, quality, manner, and relevance). Flouts also 
possess this characteristic but what separates the two is the masking or 
covering up of a violation so that it is not readily apparent. When someone 
violates the CP they do not intend it to be recognized. A flout on the other hand 
is supposed to be extremely apparent and thus easily recognized for what it is. 
The author of a flout does not intend to mislead. 
When there is a flout, the originator is supplying information without 
directly stating it. As already discussed, any conversation like the following 
involves what Grice called conversational implicature. A - Do you walk to 
school? B - I live in the suburbs. B does not directly give an answer to the 
question but A assumes that Bis cooperating and therefore recognizes the 
implied meaning of the answer as "No it is too far". This process of conveying 
inferential meaning has been utilized by researchers such as Pratt (1981) and 
Martinich (1981) to explain implied meaning in literature. Both discuss the role 
of the CP in classic works of humorous fiction. Pratt in Sterne's Tristam Shandy 
and Martinich in Carroll's Alice in Wonderland see the respective authors of 
these as engaging in repeated flouts of the CP's maxims. 
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Pratt first argues that any and all unintentional non-compliance with the 
maxims are weeded out in the editing and publishing process. Therefore all 
instances of non-compliance must necessarily be intentional. Among the types 
of intentional non-fulfillment Pratt asserts that only flouts are possible because 
fictional works simply cannot be construed as lies and by writing at all the 
author 'opts in' to the CP. 
Martinich likewise uses the CP to explain the humor in Carroll's work. 
Using the conversations between Alice and other characters, he argues that the 
instances of non-fulfillment contained in the work should be attributed to the 
characters and not to the author, thereby stating that all non-fulfillment is a flout 
in respect to the author. His contention is that Carroll means for the reader to 
recognize the surface infraction and see to the deeper implied meaning which 
does indeed abide by the CP. 
An analysis of Twain's story from the perspective of these two 
researchers would similarly describe the humor as being the product of a flout 
of the CP. Initially, such a portrayal of the story argues that in the process of 
writing, editing and publishing Twain and his editor caught and eliminated all 
instances of unintentional non-compliance. Every occasion where Twain had 
neglected to give enough information, or provided too much, every time he did 
not have enough evidence for his statements or did not believe them, every time 
he was not concise, precise and clear, all these possible infractions were 
eliminated before the story ever went to press. Therefore with Twain's story, just 
as with Sterne and Carroll, the reader is supposed to infer figurative meaning 
and interpret the story in terms of a chain of inferences leading the reader to the 
author's desired conclusion, here humorous intent. The descriptions of the 
watch's workings and the ineptitude of the repairmen are clearly not accurate 
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vis a vis the real world. But the reader should recognize this and infer that 
Twain is using exaggeration for the purpose of amusement. In the process of 
this Martinich would argue that Twain the character is indeed violating the 
maxim of quality, but Twain the writer, because we are supposed to understand 
the story, only commits a flout. Pratt would similarly claim that Twain is guilty of 
flouting the CP but rather because that is the only type of non-compliance that is 
found in prose fiction. 
One of the great weaknesses with this account is precisely this 
contention by Pratt. To claim that editors, proofreaders and publishers are 
capable of spotting and correcting every inadvertent non-fulfillment is to frankly 
give them too much credit. When one considers all of the minor spelling and 
gram mar errors that find their way into many publications, then it is naive to 
think that more difficultly spotted errors like those involved with unintentional 
non-fulfillment of the CP are all removed. This places far too much trust in 
expert figures and Twain's story itself points out the dangers in that. 
Equally damaging is Pratt's belief that in prose fiction all non-fulfillments 
are flouts and that none are violations of the CP. Again this is somewhat naive 
and Pratt does not seem to have ever considered propaganda. A look into the 
field of literature more closely shows that there are numerous examples of 
fictional works whose primary intent is to convince the reader of some political 
or philosophical point held by the writer. Ayn Rand comes quickly to mind. Her 
books The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged are excellent examples of 
fictional works espousing a political ideology, specifically conservative 
capitalism. Twain's story can hardly be called propagandistic, yet from a 
sociological perspective one can certainly argue that he is trying to convince the 
reader of some point, namely do not blindly trust experts. It can also be argued 
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that in his exaggerated descriptions he is guilty of not giving accurate 
information, thus violating the CP maxim of quality. To argue that Twain does 
not commit a violation of the CP in this story because writers of fiction simply do 
not do that is to seriously beg the question of how one can be so sure of that. 
Martinich's argument is that the author may distance himself from a 
violation by placing the onus on a character. Perhaps some claim can be made 
for a surf ace distancing as Martinich argues that Carroll wants the readers to 
recognize what he is doing. Twain likewise wishes his readers to comprehend 
the conversations and events that take place in his story. The old steamship 
buddy recommending hanging a monkey-wrench onto the safety-valve to 
correct the problem is an obvious violation of the maxim of quality as he 
certainly does not have evidence for what he is saying. Martinich would say 
that Twain on the other hand wants the reader to recognize this and that 
therefore makes it a flout from his perspective. This seems initially plausible 
since everyone knows watches do not run on steam. 
Others in the field of humor research have argued the same position as 
Martinich. Yamaguchi (1988) uses the ideas found in mention theory to claim 
that the author may only flout the CP but is free to allow his/her characters to 
violate it at will. As seen in chapter 2, mention theory has been used to account 
for irony by positing an echoic referent for the ironic utterance. That is to say 
that the referent of the expression is some earlier implicit or explicit expression 
and it is this echoic referent that distinguishes the Use of an expression from its 
Mention. Yamaguchi takes this idea and argues that in any instance of 
humorous writing the author merely mentions a violation committed in reality by 
a character. The writer echoes the violation and thus tacitly does not violate 
him/herself. In Twain's story this would mean that the final repairman indeed 
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violates the maxim of quality, yet Twain counting on the reader recognizing this, 
mentions this and thus only flouts the CP. Nevertheless it should be clear by 
now that the primary difference between a flout and a violation is the subject's 
intent and it is simply impossible to posit real world intent for a fictional creation 
with no mind of its own. Ultimately all responsibility regarding the CP must 
reside with the author. 
Dolitsky (1992) points out a central problem with the flout analysis of 
humor when she convincingly argues that in any intentionally humorous 
endeavor the originator must necessarily mislead the receiver and thereby 
violate the CP. This misleading is done by forcing upon the recipient 
stereotypical real world scripts and scenarios that do not normally result in 
humor and later showing them to be not applicable. In the case of Twain's story 
the initial description of the watch seems intended to make the reader first 
activate scenarios of events concerning the normal workings of a good watch. 
Twain walking into a jeweler's to set it to the correct time also creates very 
normal non-humorous visions of the real world. Likewise the jeweler's actions 
of trying to repair an unbroken watch bring up memories when experts only 
made matters worse, often to decidedly unfunny consequences. By the time 
Twain has left this first shop the reader has succeeded in activating a 
stereotypical sequence of events and predicts that the events to follow will 
continue to conform to the activated script. Once this has taken place Twain 
turns it all on its head by wildly exaggerating the effects and the events resulting 
from these effects. Twain initially misleads the reader in order to set him/her up 
for the humor to follow. 
Dolitsky's argument that humor violates the CP through such a 
misteading strategy contrasts sharply with the arguments of Pratt, Martinich and 
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Yamaguchi. As the entire debate revolves around author intent it seems that 
Dolitsky is correct and that humor must necessarily mislead, i.e. violate the CP. 
Because the scenario forced upon the reader of "My Watch" is normally not 
humorous, no humor is initially expected. Of course one could argue that this is 
Twain who is being discussed and that fact automatically attunes the reader to 
humor. As Gruner (1978) would claim, the notoriety of Twain as a humorist 
clearly establishes a play frame and no reader would be surprised at the humor 
to follow. 
Nevertheless, the establishing of a play frame is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to account for recognizing this as a humorous story. To simply say that 
because this is Twain we know that there will be some humor first begs the 
question of how we recognized his humor the first time we encountered it and 
secondly it is not an accurate statement. Twain's best known works, Tom 
Sawyer and Huck Finn, while containing some amusing elements are not 
essentially humorous novels. Likewise Puddin' Head Wilson and Connecticut 
Yankee. Obviously we do not see the humor of "My Watch" just because it is 
Twain. 
Dotitsky's account of the CP violating nature of humor seems a more 
accurate model of humor than does the flout or mention theory arguments. It 
essentially eliminates any claim that an author may distance him/herself from 
and intentional violation of the CP by placing the onus on a character. Still, an 
account of humor basing recognition on a violation of the CP must explain how 
we are able to recognize the intent to be funny in light of the originator's intent to 
initially mislead. This is where Dolitsky's model falls short and it is precisely 
where Attardo and Raskin begin. 
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V. A Humor CP, the GTVH and Twain 
Taking up where Dolitsky left off, Attardo (1993) argues for the CP 
violating nature of humor and posits an alternate humor CP which would 
account for humor recognition. It is his contention that a joke is recognized 
when the hearer grasps that he/she has been misled, as in the case of false 
script activation, and then backtracks to a humor CP, the maxims of which are 1. 
Quantity - Give as much information as is necessary for the joke. 
2. Quality- Say only what is consistent with the world of the joke. 3. Relation -
Say only what is relevant to the joke. 4. Manner - Tell the joke efficiently. 
Attardo claims that the humor CP is a more readily chosen option by the listener 
in cases of doubt concerning violations of Grice's CP because humorous 
exchange is more socially acceptable than lying is. 
The ability to backtrack to this CP is accomplished by an understanding 
that the speaker has abandoned a bona-fide mode of communication, where 
bona-fide is the obligatory fulfillment of Grice's maxims. Raskin and Attardo 
( 1994) argue that in the case of humor none of the normal attitudes toward 
Grice's CP apply, namely 1. an utterance may both superficially and essentially 
abide by the maxims, 2. it may only essentially honor the maxims, e.g. it may 
flout one conspicuously in order to honor another more strongly, and 3. it may 
be devoid of cooperation altogether, as in cases of lying. The authors argue 
that instances of humor, none of these are pertinant. The originator of a piece of 
humor can in no way be said to believe what they are saying, also the case in 
lying. The difference lies in the humorist's intent to have the joke eventually 
gotten whereas the liar hopes for the misleading to continue. Humor being 
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more socially acceptable, it is often the first choice of hearers when confronted 
with not readily apparent jokes or lies. According to Raskin and Attardo humor 
can occur in one of four settings: 1 a. The speaker makes the joke 
unintentionally. 1 b. The speaker makes the joke intentionally. 2a. The hearer 
doesn't expect the joke. 2b. The hearer expects the joke. The focus of this 
investigation is in instances where 1 b and 2b intersect. In such cases the 
parties involved in the humorous discourse are quickly attuned to the maxims of 
the humor CP. This of course does not necessitate immediate and automatic 
activation of this CP on the part of the receiver. First the violation must be 
recognized and should this occur too easily the the humor will be less effective, 
as when adults listen to children's jokes, and if it is too difficult then the humor is 
in danger of failing altogether. 
Raskin and Attardo attempt to describe the features present enabling a 
joke that is intentionally told and expected to be recognized. In their General 
Theory of Verbal Humor (GTVH) the researchers posit six Knowledge 
Resources (KRs) that inform a joke. It is the presence of violations of the 
Gricean CP contained in certain of the KRs of a joke that allow the hearer to first 
understand that a bona-fide mode of communication has been abandoned and 
then to backtrack to the humor CP. In the light of the argument that humor 
routinely violates at least the maxim of quality, it is not surprising that the first KR 
is script oppositions. Humor often takes advantage of the listener by combining 
and making compatible partially or fully incompatible scripts. The violation is 
seen when the listener activates one script and later discovers that it does not 
apply as in many jokes that revolve around a smart/dumb opposition. For 
example a joke about the number of 'Polacks' it takes to change a light bulb 
plays on the normal light bulb changing script and juxtaposes that with 'the 
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abnormal scenario of the joke. Of course with this and other semi-fixed form 
jokes, the realization that the activated script does not apply and that a bona-
fide mode has been abandoned leads to a very fast backtracking to the humor 
CP. 
The second KR is found in the actual wording or language of the joke. 
The language of a particular piece of humor not only allows for paraphrases to 
still be recognizably funny in their intent, but it also determines the placement of 
functional elements in a joke, for example the punch line. In jokes similar to the 
'Polack' joke the punch line contains the information being imparted. If the 
speaker were really interested in telling the listeners something informative 
about 'Polacks' then there would be no need to start with a question and then 
follow it up with an answer. This violates the Gricean maxims of manner and 
relevance and allows the listener to recognize that bona-fide communication 
has been abandoned. 
The third KR is the logical mechanism, or manner in which the script 
oppositions are connected. It is through playful juxtaposition and false analogy 
that opposing scripts are connected in a way that allows the hearer of a joke to 
understand that bona-fide communication is not in force. For example: Did you 
hear about the baby born with both male and female characteristics? It has 
both a penis and a brain. This joke juxtaposes real life birth defects to more 
normal infants. Also false analogy is used as the baby in the joke is in no way 
really like a hermaphrodite. These also violates the Gricean maxim of quality 
and activate a humor CP. 
The next KR is the target, or butt of the joke. Who or what is being made 
fun of is easy to see with many types of humor. In other instances no one group 
is singled out, as in 'Polack' jokes, but rather humanity itself seems to be the 
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target. In black humor this seems especially so. What does NASA stand for? 
Need Another Seven Astronauts. This joke told soon after the Challenger 
disaster actually targets far more than the seven peopled killed. Rather the 
dangers inherent in humanity's most significant endeavors are ridiculed as a 
means of coming to terms with the tragedy. It seems that it is not the target itself 
which signals the hearer to backtrack to a humor CP, but instead it is what is 
said about or done to the target that allows this to happen. 
A fifth KR is contained in the narrative strategy of the joke, where this is 
the vehicle of the humor's presentation. Rigid in 'knock-knock' or light bulb 
changing jokes, it can also be flexible as in the tan tale where the rules of 
literary license apply. This KR accounts for the fact that a joke must be in some 
organized form, be it question and answer, an aside in a conversation or a 
simple narrative. It alone does not suffice to trigger the humor CP. 
The last KR is found in the situation or activity in the joke. Very often the 
situations are stereotypical events without any humor at all in them in real life. 
Changing light bulbs or chickens crossing roads are good illustrations. These 
scripts are frequently utilized to activate thought processes that can be 
juxtaposed to the events unfolding in the piece of humor. Occasionally certain 
situations allow themselves to become commonly used in humor by their very 
mundaneness. Such seems to be the case with chickens crossing roads and 
changing light bulbs. The very hearing of these two situations put into question 
form is almost itself enough for the listener to know that bona-fide 
communication is not being used. 
By exploring the various KRs informing jokes, Raskin and Attardo have 
provided a model of humor recognition much more sophisticated than 
typologies, incongruity theory or appeals to Gricean flouts are capable of. 
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Instead of simply categorizing humor types, arguing for the resolution of 
incongruity or positing a distancing of the author to make humor a flout, the 
GTVH would analyze Twain's story in the light of the six knowledge resources' 
ability to activate the humor CP. This theory was developed to better account 
for instances of verbal humor. The following analysis will illustrate its 
applicability to humorous literature, at least in the case of the tall tale. 
VI. The Knowledge Resources of "My Watch" 
The first KR, script oppositions, builds upon incongruity theory when 
describing partially or fully incompatible script scenarios. In 11 My Watch" the 
oppositions clearly comprise categories such as expert/novice (the 
repairmen/Twain), and competent/incompetent or smart/stupid as with real 
world repairmen and those of the story. Another opposition is to be seen in the 
naivete of Twain the character and Twain the real world writer. By creating a 
story where the authorities upon whom one must rely are bumbling boobs and 
at the same time allowing himself to be lead around by the nose for fear of 
appearing ignorant to strangers, Twain forces the reader to compare events in 
the story with real world occurrences. This naturally brings together at least 
partially incompatible scenarios or scripts. 
Very few of us would go to the lengths that Twain does to repair a good, 
pocket watch. 'Then I prepared to cross-question him rigidly, for this thing was 
getting serious. The watch had cost two hundred dollars originally, and I 
seemed to have paid out two of three thousands for repairs (p. 66)." Having 
paid originally $200 for it, a large amount of money in 1870, he proceeds to 
spend two or three thousands for its repair, the money all the while going to 
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progressively inept experts. It is as unlikely that the real Twain would do such 
as thing as it is that we would. 
This set of opposing scripts is strengthened by the opposition of the 
story's repairmen versus ones in real life. No technical master so incompetent 
would remain long in business and the last repairman of the story, the ex-
steamship buddy, stresses precisely this. The depth of his lack of 
understanding is too great even for Twain. And coupled with his mounting 
frustration, this soon results in the repairman's death, an event most readers 
must sympathize with because of similar situations we have been in. 
The third opposition, expert/novice, builds on this. The relationships 
between Twain and the repairmen are reminiscent of our own lives, but hardly 
accurate depictions of real life events. Even though most of us have at one time 
or another been taken for a ride, we certainly put our feet down sooner than 
Twain does in the story. Twain's repairmen are not dishonest people, they 
merely do not know what they are doing. In sort of a perverse Peter Principle, 
already incompetent people have risen to an even further level of incompetency 
and most of us would see this quicker than Twain the character. Twain alludes 
to this when he implies that watchmakers are in fact failed experts from other 
fields. 11 My uncle William ... used to wonder what became of all the unsuccessful 
tinkers, and gunsmiths, and shoemakers, and engineers, and blacksmiths; but 
nobody could ever tell him (p. 67)." 
All three of these oppositions force the reader to recognize that the story 
is not to be viewed as an attempt to accurately portray the real world. As it is a 
piece of fiction, the reader's disbelief is already suspended, but the oppositions 
contained in this KR distance even further the events of the story from real life. 
Good drama is just that because characters, relationships and events are taken 
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from real life. Even though we know none of the things happened to any such 
person, in quality drama we recognize that very similar things do occur to 
similar real people. But in the case of "My Watch" the gross exaggeration of 
characters and events marks a clear violation of the standard CP, even in terms 
of the world of fiction. Thus the script oppositions in the story not only signal that 
the mode of communication as non-bona-fide, they do so in relation to the world 
of fiction helping to distinguish humorous prose from other fictional genres. 
Looking at the story from the perspective of the third KR, logical 
mechanism, yields further insights. The manner of connecting script 
oppositions in this story comprises both false analogy and juxtaposition. By 
equating the watch with the powers that control the natural course of time, 
Twain creates a world that would be frightening if it were not so amusing. In our 
world watch is to time as thermometer is to temperature, that is a man made 
construct that can only measure natural occurances. Yet in the story the 
analogy becomes causal, as watch is to time is now like dam is to river. Instead 
of measuring nature, Twain's malfunctioning watch directly influences it. Just as 
a dam can prevent the flow of a river or cause a flood, so Twain's watch slows 
down and speeds up the course of time. In addition, the juxtapositions of the 
repairmen and Twain the character vis a vis their real world counterparts enable 
the reader to discern the author's humorous intent. Experts are simply not that 
inept and no one would go to the lengths that Twain did to have a watch 
repaired. The logical mechanisms of this story both violate the Gricean CP, 
specifically in relation to the maxim of quality and thereby signal a departure 
from the bona-fide mode of communication. 
The fourth KR is the target. In certain instances of verbal humor the target 
is quite easy to see, for example in ethnic humor. Also in literature some social 
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group or other, or even a character, may be the target of the humor. In the case 
of Twain's story one could initially believe that the target is Twain himself. 
Perhaps he is relating in a humorous fashion some incident he himself has 
experienced. This could especially be the case when one considers his silence 
for fear of appearing ignorant with each and every comment made by the 
repairmen. "My Watch" could be a warning to the reader that we should be less 
concerned with appearances than he himself was. 
Though this possibility does exist, it strikes the reader more aptly that the 
target of humor in the story is more general than simply Twain himself. It seems 
that the true target is humanity itself and modern man in particular. Twain's 
story highlights modern man's over-reliance on technology and technological 
experts. The watch's ability to control natural and man-made phenomena 
focuses the reader's attention on the distance such technology has carried 
humanity from the natural world. Twain's experiences with his watch controlling 
his life are only exaggerated forms of how our clocks control us. 
A second aspect of humanity as the target is contained in the 
descriptions of the technical experts and also in Twain's actions in relation to 
their actions. Each repairman is more inept than the last, a condition which the 
reader is supposed to compare to his/her own experiences. Naturally not all 
experts, in any field, are incompetent, but certainly in every field some are. This 
in conjunction with Twain's passive acceptance of their expertise should cause 
the reader to reexamine his/her own blind faith in so-called experts whom we 
should always and immediately appeal to. Therefore, the target as another KR 
which informs humor contributes information enabling the reader to discern the 
humorous intent. 
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Another KR aiding in the recognition of humor is the narrative strategy. 
Unlike some instances of verbal humor where the narrative strategy is 
somewhat fixed, as in knock-knock jokes, in the case of "My Watch" the vehicle 
of the humor's presentation is extremely flexible. As a literary genre one would 
first categorize this as a short story and then further type it as a tall tale. Twain's 
first person narrative exaggerates real world daily events to an absurd degree. 
The absurdities then quickly cross beyond exaggeration and become 
outrageously unreal. This however does not suffice for the recognition of 
humorous intent. Other genres such as romance, horror and science 
fiction/fantasy similarly utilize a great deal of absurd exaggeration. It is only in 
conjunction with the other five KRs that the information gleaned from looking at 
the narrative strategy helps in recognizing the humorous intent. 
The last KR to be considered is the situation, here the repairing of a 
watch. Like many situations of humor, the standard scenario is often taken from 
daily events and from ordinarily unfunny ones at that. These standard 
scenarios serve to activate stereotypical scripts which are shown later not to 
apply. This is clearly the case with this story as Twain first has us conjure up 
images of normal watch repair procedures and then wildly departs from the 
images we have brought up. As the story progresses the script first envisioned 
by the reader recedes further and further as the watch's actions and the 
repairmen themselves are described in ways only slightly reminiscent of real 
life. It is the situation of the story that acts as a weight in the creating of script 
oppositions and the connecting of these oppositions in the logical mechanism 
that allow the reader to understand Twain's humorous intent. The situation is all 
part of the original set up meant to mislead the reader until the humor can be 
sprung. 
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VII. Conclusion 
This analysis has shown first that Raskin and Attardo's General Theory of 
Verbal Humor is indeed generalizable to at least some types of literary humor, 
namely the humorous short story or tall tale. In the course of this analysis it has 
also been shown that the GTVH is a far more sophisticated model of the humor 
recognition process than humor typologies, incongruity theory or appeals to 
G ricean flouts via mention theory. While typologies allow the investigator to 
gain some insights into the character of humorous pieces, they simply do not 
address the central question of this thesis, i. e. how do we recognize intentional 
humor as such? Incongruity theory also contributes to humor research but it 
has been shown to be lacking in both descriptive and explanatory powers. The 
appeal to the recognition and resolution of opposing pairs of scripts does yield 
insights into humor recognition, but its weaknesses vis a vis Raskin and 
Attardo's GTVH are clear. The insights to be gained are better accounted for in 
the KRs situation, script opposition and logical mechanism. Equally 
unappealing is Pratt's and Martinich's claim that humor is the result of a Gricean 
flout. Merely claiming that the receiver of a piece of humor recognizes it as an 
attempt at humor just because the originator intended it that way does little for 
how the receiver actually got to that conclusion. Similarly, distancing the 
originator from any violation by appealing to character's intent, in the case of a 
mention theory account of humor, is untenable. It seems correct to account for 
humor by appealing to the originator's intent. But the claim that the intent of the 
author is somehow different from that of a character gives the character a sense 
of volition that it patently cannot possess. Clearly, in the field of humor research 
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a more sophisticated account of humor recognition is created by appealing to 
the originator's initial misleading intent contained in the KRs posited by Raskin 
and Attardo. It is the recognition of this intent that allows the receiver of a piece 
of intentional humor to backtrack to a humor CP and thereby recognize it as 
humor. 
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Chapter Four 
Limitations, Further Research and TESOL 
I. Limitations 
Although Raskin and Attardo have created a more sophisticated account 
of verbal humor recognition which can be generalized further to account for 
some written humor, the positing of an alternate CP does bring certain 
questions into the investigation. Grice originally argued for a Cooperative 
Principle to account for certain instances on implied meaning. By means of 
inferential chains beginning with the assumption that the other participants in 
the exchange are cooperating, all those involved are able to infer the meaning 
behind what is said when what is said is blatantly off target. Many examples of 
this have been given in theis thesis and from the literature it is clear that Grice's 
CP has enormous explanatory power. Therein lies the hitch. Any principle so 
powerful in its ability to account for implied meaning is a bit suspicious. By 
ultimately standing on inference as its foundation, Grice's CP is capable of 
much manipulation by the clever researcher. This is not to say that the Gricean 
CP and its maxims are without merit, for again there is much that is logical about 
them. However, up to this point there remains no means of testing it other than 
for researchers to posit series of infertial chains of assumptions. 
This leads directly to the second limitation with Raskin and Attardo's 
General Theory of Verbal Humor. Not only do the authors base their theory on 
the arguement that humor is the result of a violation of the Gricean CP, they 
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further go on to create a humor CP which is to account for humor recognition. In 
creating a humor CP, the researchers compound the problem of using the 
untestable CP of Grice as a foundation by utilizing another equally empirically 
untestable principle as a central core to their theory. If Grice's initial CP remains 
untestable after 20 years, it seems plausible that a diagnostic for a humor CP 
will prove just as elusive. 
Another problem with positing a separate humor CP comes with the 
question of, if we need a separate CP for humor, might we also need others for 
different types of what Raskin and Attardo call non-bona-fide modes of 
communication. Their belief that humor is non-bona-fide rests on the claim that 
with humor none of the normal attitudes towards Grice's CP apply. That is to 
say that humor neither superficially nor essentially abides by the maxims, yet it 
is not devoid of cooperation. If this is true of humor, is it not also true of many 
other types of communication. In applying Raskin and Attardo's GTVH to literary 
humor, it was established that the GTVH could indeed account for the humor in 
at least one type of literary humor far better than other existing theories in humor 
research. It seems therefore plausible that other literary genres might equally 
be accounted for through the creation of for example horror, tragedy, or science 
fiction CPs in their ultimate foundation. Likewise, one can consider instances in 
which communicative acts taken from their special surroundings lose their 
original meaning, for instance in religious rituals where food or drink is blessed 
in such a way as to undergo a transformation from profane to sacred. Removed 
from the ritual context, such a rite becomes blasphemy. Therefore, perhaps 
there is a religious CP which can account for the recognition of the scared. The 
problem soon becomes apparent that a danger exists in an over-proliferation of 
CPs needed to account for the very many differing types of human 
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communicative behavior. That is not to say that separate CPs would indeed be 
necessary for these and other cases, but the researcher utilyzing Grice's 
original principle needs to be cautious in creating addendums to a theory justto 
handle new cases. 
Other limitations with the GTVH and its application to literary humor 
revolve around the specifics of the theory itself. It has been argued in this thesis 
that the knowledge resources 1. script opposition, 2. language, and 3. logical 
mechanism contain the violations of the G ricean maxims which allow the 
hearer/reader to recognize non-bona-fide communication and ultimately humor. 
Limiting the efficacy of the GTVH are the exact roles played by the other three 
knowledge resources. 
The target of humor as a knowledge resource without doubt informs the 
piece of humor, but as seen in the section on humor typologies the target can 
change with but a small change in focus while the remainder of the humor stays 
the same. This is easily demonstrated with a light bulb joke that first targets an 
ethnic group, say 'Polacks', then is altered to target sorority girls. 
1. How many 'Polacks, does it take to change a light bulb? Three. One to hold it 
and two to turn the table he's standing on. 2. How many sorority girls does it 
take to change a light bulb? Three. Two to watch while one calls daddy. 
The other KRs are either only slightly different or they have not changed at all 
and it is this that captures the similarity between the jokes. It appears that it is 
not the target itself which so much informs the humor, even though it does point 
out the butt, but rather what is said and done to or by the target is what really 
informs the humor. Anyone or anything is a potential target for humor, and the 
manner in which this KR enables the hearer/reader to recognize humorous 
intent is unclear. There is really nothing intrinsically funny about either target 
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group, and one could substitute just about any group at all as the target and the 
result would still be recognizably a joke. Also it is difficult to see where a 
Gricean violation could occur in this KR. More investigation into the manner that 
the other KRs connect and interact with this one needs to be done in order to 
get a clearer picture of the role that the target as a knowledge resource 
informing humor plays. 
The next knowledge resource whose role is unclear is the situation. Just 
as with the target, any situation or activity is potentially humorous, particularly 
with the more irreverent among us. Mostly the situations in humor seem to be 
mundane events of daily life, changing light bulbs for instance. And it is also 
possible to alter the situation of a piece of humor without effectively changing 
the humor itself. For example the sorority girl light bulb joke could involve 
changing a tire or even walking a dog. Like the target, the situation in humor 
seems to inform the piece because of the interaction between it and the other 
KRs. Exactly what these interactions are and what their parameters might be 
remains to be investigated. 
Another KR that requires clarification is the narrative strategy. Raskin 
and Attardo call this resource the vehicle of presentation and use it to account 
for the fact that humor must be cast in some organizational form, for example a 
riddle in question/answer form or a witty aside in some conversation. However, 
going into no further depth as to what elements comprise this resource leaves 
the researcher with merely a statement that such and such piece of humor has 
such and such form. There must be a fuller description of the role this resource 
has in order to account for say differences between limericks and humorous 
poems, for example those of C. Morgenstern. Limericks are very fixed in form 
and even minimal alteration changes a limerick to something else. Clearly 
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there the organizational form of a limerick aids in the recognition of it as such. 
Therefore, it seems that there must be something more to the narrative strategy 
as a knowledge resource that aids in the recognition of other types of humor. 
Very possibly most humor types are not as easily recognizable through their 
form as the limerick is, but that does not entail that this resource plays only a 
minimal part in the recognizability of other instances of humor. 
Lastly, the language resource also requires further thought. According to 
the authors of the GTVH, this resource accounts for the actual phrasing of a 
humorous piece and the placing of functional elements within that piece. Still, it 
must be conceded that some people are better joke tellers, and writers, than 
others. Should everything else about a joke be the same but two different 
people tell it, one a professional comic and the other anyone off the street, 
chances are that the comic will tell it better. The script oppositions, the logical 
mechanisms, the target, the situation and the narrative strategy are all the same, 
even the language is the same yet there is a large difference in hearer 
reception, so much so that in certain cases it is concievable that the humor 
could not even be recognized when told by a very bad joke teller. It seems that 
the difference must lie in the language knowledge resource and that in order to 
capture it this resource must be expanded to include prosodic features like 
pitch, intonation, rhythym, etc. Surely these factor into humor appreciation and 
it seems very plausible that they also factor into humor recognition. Further 
investigation into the features included in this and the other KRs will only make 
the GTVH stronger and more accountable. 
In considering whether new insights have been reached through this 
analysis, it seems that the KRs posited by Raskin and Attardo may not all be 
pertinant to instances of literary humor. The roles played by the narrative 
78 
strategy, the target and the situation do not necessarily help the reader in 
concluding that bona-fide communication is not in force. Rather, the 
connections the other KRs have in relation to these seem to more clearly signal 
abandonment of bona-fide discourse. Although this thesis has shown that the 
GTVH is expandable to certain types of literary humor, there remains a strong 
possibility that other knowledge resources exit which have yet to be discovered 
and investigated. 
II. Further Research 
As previously alluded to, certain limitations inherent in Raskin and 
Attardo's General Theory of Verbal Humor are in part traceable to the youth of 
the field of humor research. Unclarity in the descriptions and workings of 
certain of the KRs can be rectified through further investigation and analysis. 
Not only will the continued research into the exact natures of all of the KRs 
enhance the theory, but their use in analyzing various types of humor will 
certainly add weight to the argument that humor revolves around initial 
misleading intent. 
It has been the contention of this thesis all along that Raskin and 
Attardo's GTVH is the more sophisticated model of intentional humor 
recognition and that this account of verbal humor is generalizable to at least 
one type of literary humor, namely the humorous short story or tall tale. Further 
analyses of other types of literary humor, for instance parody and satire could 
quite possibly illustrate that the GTVH is similarly explanatory of literary humor 
per se. A scathing satire like Swift's A Modest Proposal or a social parody like 
Wilde's The Importance of Being Ernest would make excellent vehicles for 
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investigating the greater generalizability of this theory in the realm of literature. 
In fact the works of many authors from many different ages should be utilized in 
ongoing research. The advantages to this are not only in the strengthening of 
the theory, but they lie also in the gaining of insight concerning the loss of 
humor recognizability over time. Clearly the satire of Art Buchwald is more 
easily seen than that of Swift, for the first time reader of both. What aspects of 
the KRs fade over time and recede from public awareness? 
Additional research must also be made into the parameters of the KRs 
interactions vis a vis the limits to humor recognition and as well appreciation. It 
seems to be the case that other genres of fictional prose often exhibit some of 
the knowledge resources that inform humor. Horror for instance certainly 
makes use of script oppositions and logical mechanisms. Rothbart in her study 
seems to be on to something in connecting the manner of resolving humor with 
that of horror. By investigating the interactions of the six KRs it is possible that 
they will be shown to aid the reader in distinguishing between the various 
genres of fictional prose. For example it is plausible that it is in the script 
oppositions that one is able to differentiate humor from drama, while the 
language KR aids in separating humor from horror. 
This leads directly to another possibility for further research. Although it 
was stated previously that an over-proliferation of CPs would be a damaging 
limitation to Raskin and Attardo's theory, it is possible that only a few more CPs 
are necessary to account for other types of implied meaning. It would be of 
great interest to see research conducted pertaining to the role the Gricean CP 
plays in the distinguishing of different types of not only literature but also ritual 
behavior. The old saying that there is a time and a place for everything is 
pertinant to this discussion as a priest conducting an official ceremony is 
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recognized by the laiety as either performing it correctly or not. In the 
recognition of this can Grice's CP alone account for this or is there some signal 
which triggers a ritual CP which in turn allows the viewers and participants of a 
ceremony to recognize it as such? Of course a certain ritual frame is often 
established to aid in the recognition, but as with humor it seems that this is 
probably not enough. Furthermore, merely positing ritual or play frame 
establishment as a basis for recognition of rituals and humor simply begs the 
question as to how the frame initially came to be recognized as a means for 
conveying these types of communication. 
Returning to the field of humor research, additional avenues of 
investigation clearly lie in the interaction between the humor CP, prosodic 
features of language and body language itself. This connects back to the role of 
humor's delivery not in its appreciation aspect but in its very recognition. Some 
people simply tell jokes better and further research needs to be conducted into 
the manner that pitch, intonation, timing, organization, etc. enable the hearer to 
recognize that bona-fide communication has been abandoned. The skits of 
Steve Martin in the 1970s often contained his well known long, drawn out and 
rising pitched Well Excuuuse Meee! It seems clear that the language KR 
posited by Raskin and Attardo should very well be able to account for the 
prosodic elements so clearly contained in many instances of verbal humor. 
Likewise, body language is an intricate part of much verbal humor and the 
GTVH also needs to be expanded to include this. Clearly at times body 
language simply adds to the effect or to the appreciation of humor, but in other 
cases it seems alone responsible for humor recognition, as when someone 
winks after pulling your leg. 
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There are also numerous possibilities for further research in the ability of 
using insights gained from humor research in language teaching. Apte (1985) 
argued that because humor is by and large culturally based, it can be utilized as 
a major conceptual and methodological tool for gaining insights into cultural 
systems. Humor is the result of cultural perceptions, both individual and 
collective, of incongruity, exaggeration, distortion and any unusual combination 
of cultural elements. It is culturally based in the sense that individual cultural 
systems influence the stimuli that trigger the humor experience. Familiarity with 
the cultural codes is a prerequisite for recognizing these stimuli. This familiarity 
is for the most part unconscious as the members of a cultural group are aware 
of the background knowledge implicit to the recognition of humor generating 
stimuli. Any individual who is not a member of a given group will not have 
internalized the group's behavioral patterns and values and thereby may not 
experience humor. In instances of linguistic humor, e.g. puns, riddles, 
witticisms, etc., a lack of command in the target language will inhibit 
understanding. The degree of comprehension and appreciation of linguistic 
humor is a function of proficiency in the language being used. 
In American culture humor seems to be ubiquitous. Used and accepted 
in almost any situation, formal and informal, it is necessary for second language 
learners to be able to recognize the humorous intent of utterances. Humor to a 
large degree affects the very organization of conversations. Viewed as 
enjoyable and pleasurable, it often serves to relax the participants and signals a 
time out from more serious language and social interaction. According to 
Norrick humor is also often involved in the foundation of the micro-organization 
of conversations, for example in spontaneous puns in an utterance pair. This 
involvement is seen to progress often to higher levels of organization in such 
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areas as openings, closings, topic shifts and the alignment of participants. 
Humor can even become the primary organizational principle in conversation, 
as in bantering and joke telling sessions. 
Sherzer notes humor helps to establish rapport via anecdote swapping 
and joking relationships and to say that someone has a sense of humor is to 
say that they find the same things funny as we do. As important as it is for 
language learners to grasp these aspects of humor, it is equally necessary to 
understand humor's capacity to produce animosity. Through mocking, sarcasm 
and personal attack humor is often used to define social boundaries in group 
identification. Less overtly, humor is also a mechanism of aggression in terms 
of testing the knowledge and intelligence of conversational partners. 
Bouton (1994) notes that cultural misunderstandings often arise from the 
different expectations or ideas of the Cooperative Principle possessed by 
different cultures. He begins by arguing that conversational implicature as a 
means of expressing a message indirectly is well established. Furthermore, this 
very common, unremarkable strategy is successfully interpreted only when 
there is a common understanding of the expectations in a conversation. From 
the information contained in this thesis it should be clear by now that humor 
recognition is very much tied to Grice's CP. And the ESUEFL teacher who 
desires to impart aspects of American culture to the students eventually must 
touch on the subject of humor. In order to better understand and teach humor 
as a cultural entity, the language teacher should become familiar first with the 
principles of pragmatics and second with those of humor research 
Bouton conducted a study at the University of Illinois with 436 non-native 
English speaking students (NNS) upon arrival in the U.S. in Aug. 1986, again 5 
months later and once more at 12 months of residence in the U.S. After a pilot 
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study conducted on 79 NNSs and 60 native English speaking students (NS) 
determined that implicature interpretation was consistent among among NSs, 
and markedly different response were obtained from the NNSs, a written 
elicitation instrument was employed which required the students to interpret 
implicature from a dialogue. With 436 students tested, only 79% of the 
responses were the same as those chosen by NSs. These results remained the 
same in the follow up studies. Four and a half years later, 30 of the original 
NNSs who took part in the pilot study were tested again. Although increased 
proficiency in interpreting implicature was noted, statistically significant 
differences remained. 
The conclusions for this study are clear. If students after four years still 
have difficulty in interpreting Gricean conversational implicature, how much 
more difficult must it be for them to grasp humor. If we are to prepare our 
students well, we must begin teaching pragmatic aspects of our culture 
explicitly. This is not to say that we teach linguistic theory, rather that we bring 
to our students' attention the communicative importance of these principles and 
allow them to practice interpreting implied meaning. Such a study goes a long 
way in supporting the claim that pragmatics needs to be a required part of any 
advanced teacher training. 
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